PREAMBLE
Part 1 of this essay is accessiable HERE.
Professor YAN Xuetong - Tsinghua University and foreign member of Russia Academy of Science - continues with his world assessment for the year 2024.
He recommends that Beijing focus more on substantive diplomatic goals in and around its neighbourhood than on communicating abstract concepts to the world.
Yan reiterates his consternation over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the damage it has caused to his country; criticises those in China and elsewhere who analyse such conflicts through the lens of history rather than focusing on the motivations of those who launched it; warns against governments using history as a means of whipping up “antagonistic sentiments”.
As an influential and a rather well-connected figure in China, let us read his opinion in that interview conducted by The Paper (澎湃新闻)
which is an excerpt herein.
IN 2024, THE WORLD WILL HEAD TOWARDS MORE CONFRONTATION UNDERPINNED BY DE-GLOBALISATION (EXCERPTS)
Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Interview by The Paper (澎湃新闻) – 29 December 2023
I. On the drivers behind the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Palestinian wars
“The reasons behind the military conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and between the Palestinians and the Israelis are not the central issue in these two wars. The key issue is why these military conflicts escalated into wars. Military conflicts between states are a regular occurrence, but while some are contained, others escalate into wars. In my view, the reason why both of these military conflicts escalated into wars was due to domestic factors. That is, it was related to the political power of the decision-makers. In other words, if the escalation of these conflicts had been contained in time, the decision-makers on the warring sides may already have been replaced by now. At present, not only are the decision-makers who are directly engaged in these wars thinking about their war-related policies from the perspective of [governance and] political power, but even US President Joe Biden, who has been providing assistance in these wars, has supported Netanyahu’s war efforts largely on the basis of domestic electoral considerations.”
“Many of those who analyse international conflicts invariably explain them through the lens of history. This type of explanation lacks scientific validity. History is about things that have already taken place and that can no longer be changed. In other words, the influence of history on future events is a constant rather than a variable. International conflicts begin and end under the influence of an unchanging past, so that one and the same historical factor cannot be used to explain why conflicts sometimes occur and why they sometimes do not. That is to say, history by itself is not enough to trigger new conflicts. Moreover, the influence of history on subsequent events weakens over time until its impact is no longer substantive. This is not to deny that historical factors can have an impact on existing conflicts, but rather to say that they are not decisive [没有决定性作用]. With history [acting] as a constant, what causes new conflicts must be occurrences that have only just taken place, rather than [those from] a long-distant past. In most cases, history is a tool used to legitimise policies of confrontation and war. Thus, in order to avoid the escalation of conflicts into wars, one must be on guard against those who use history to stir up antagonistic sentiments [需要防范有人利用历史煽动对立情绪].”
II. On the negative impact that the war in Ukraine has had on China
“It has been over a year and a half since May last year [i.e. 2022] and the current facts show that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has done even more harm to our country than I had predicted at the time.”
[ Note: Yan is referring to an article he published in Foreign Affairs in May 2022 when he said, “Refusing to condemn Russia has strained China’s relations with some of its neighbours and distanced Beijing from many developing nations that have lined up against Russia’s war in Ukraine.” ]
“From a strategic point of view, European countries have tilted [even further] towards the United States in the context of the US-China rivalry for they need the US’s help in fighting this war.”
“East Asian countries have abandoned their hedging strategies and expanded their security dependence on Washington to include economic security as well. The previous strategic balancing of economic dependence on China and security dependence on the US that existed before 2022 has been broken.”
“Militarily, not a single American soldier in the Asia-Pacific has been redeployed to Europe since 2022, while the European members of NATO have for their part sent warships and aircraft to the Asia-Pacific.”
“Economically, developed countries have reduced their investments in China, while Europe has suspended the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) that was due to be signed and now wants to ink an investment agreement with Taiwan.”
“Politically, the stance of most developing countries with regard to this conflict differs from ours more than it does from India's. This has created the conditions for India to become the leading representative of the Global South.”
“Some believe that the conflict has provided our country with an opportunity to expand its influence in Central Asia. But [this has taken place] precisely [because] the war has weakened Russia. It has not [helped] us erect a strategic barrier against NATO.”
“The damage done to our country by this conflict is not only obvious but will last for years.”
III. On the biggest election year in history and where the world is headed
“These elections [in the US, Taiwan, the EU, Russia and elsewhere] all have the effect of increasing global political uncertainty. Thus, in 2024, the world as a whole will head towards more conflicts and confrontation, underpinned by the current [trend towards] de-globalisation. The emergence of unexpected international military conflicts will continue in 2024 and the risk of their escalating into [all-out] wars cannot be ruled out. Global economic growth will be lower than in 2023, yet the GDP gap between the United States and other big countries will widen further. Populism continues to extend its reach and its [global] influence may outstrip that of liberalism. Domestic social fractures within the world’s major powers will worsen and the social base for radicalism will expand. [Political] polarisation will increase at both the international and domestic levels. Grievances will exacerbate uncertainties at both levels and will lead to more unforeseen events [意外事件].”
IV. On the upcoming US election and its impact on US-China relations
“US-China relations in 2024 will be affected by the US election process rather than the outcome of the election. The US election will be held in early November 2024, which means that the impact of the election results on bilateral relations between China and the US will not begin until 2025. If Biden is re-elected, US-China antagonism [中美关系的对抗性] will continue to rise. If Trump is elected, the relationship will be in a state of even greater uncertainty as his policy towards China is more volatile [更加多变] than Biden’s. For instance, Trump visited China in November 2017 and in the US National Security Strategy published in December [that year] identified China as [America’s] greatest strategic challenger.”
“Due to the prevailing anti-China mindset [反华思潮] within the US at the moment, the two candidates will be competing to show who is more anti-China than the other. With Biden in power, his China policy will therefore have a greater impact on bilateral relations than Trump's campaign speeches. The US election next year [i.e. this year] is bound to have a negative impact on the US-China relationship, making a further rise in bilateral hostility [对抗] possible. If we want to prevent this antagonism from escalating out of control into a conflict, we need to be proactive in adopting certain measures. We cannot rely on Biden, who is seeking re-election, to take the initiative in containing potential crises.”
“It would be inappropriate for our government to take a position on the US’s domestic affairs [我国政府对美国内政问题不宜表态], lest the American public be misled into believing that we are interfering in the their election. [We should] try to restore previously existing channels of intergovernmental dialogue and encourage working-level personnel from specific departments [technically “functional departments (职能部门)”] within the US government to adopt rational policies when managing US-China competition. [We should also] increase people-to-people exchanges at the societal level in order to enable as many Americans as possible to look at the US-China relationship in a rational manner.”
V. On China’s communication efforts abroad and foreign media
“Mutual understanding at any level requires effective communication. Effective communication is based on two necessary conditions: the first is dialogue and exchange and the second is the ability of both parties to understand the meaning [含义] of each other's expressions. At present, our country is facing the problem of not having sufficiently fulfilled either of these necessary conditions in presenting its strategic concepts to the world. External communiqués are a way of conveying strategic concepts, but they are read by very few people. Not only do foreigners seldom read these, but only a minority in China does so. For foreigners to accept these strategic notions, one must first solve the problem of how to make them aware of their existence. I believe that the basic answer to this problem is to have foreign media report on our country's strategic concepts, because it is their reporting that will enable their [respective] countrymen to learn about these ideas. That is why it is necessary to make it easier [提供便利条件] for foreign media to come and report on China. As for how to make the other side comprehend what our strategic concepts mean, it is necessary for foreign media to explain them in their own words. That is because foreign journalists know best what type of language will allow their countrymen to understand them.”
VI. On the primacy of China’s periphery diplomacy
“Providing stabilising factors for the international order depends primarily on diplomatic action rather than communication abroad [靠外交行动而不是外宣]. The issues that will have the greatest negative impact on the international order in 2024 are the Israeli-Palestinian war and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Our country is not a party to either of these conflicts and therefore can play only a very limited role [能起到的作用非常有限]. As the most powerful country in East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia, our country has direct influence on the security environment in those three regions. If we can provide factors to stabilise the security environment there, we will also be providing stabilising factors for the security environment globally. With the exception of the domestic military conflict in Myanmar, there has been no international war in East Asia since the end of the Cambodian-Vietnamese war in 1991. The peaceful climate in [our] region is significantly better than in Europe, the Eurasian space, the Middle East and Africa. Continuing to maintain long-term peace in East Asia would be an important contribution. The greatest destabilising factor for the regional order in Central Asia lies in its domestic affairs. [Our helping] guard against the spread of domestic unrest in Central Asian countries beyond their borders through security cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) would be a positive thing. The main problem for the order in South Asia is India's increasing inclination to pressure its neighbours militarily [越来越倾向以军事手段施压邻国] as its economy gains momentum. China can hardly influence India's security policy. Thus, in South Asia, [our] focus should be on guarding against India's excessive use of military force.”
The Author
Name: Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Date of birth: 7 December 1952 (age: 71)
Position: Director of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.
Previously: Researcher at the MSS-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1982-1984 and 1992-2000.
Research focus: International relations
Education: BA Heilongjiang University (1982); MA University of International Relations (1986); PhD University of California, Berkeley (1992)
For a more detailed overview of Yan’s career, interests, awards and publications, see here.
