The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is composed of US, India, Australia, and Japan , and the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) is an technology-sharing agreement that allows US and UK to help Australia to obtain nuclear-powered submarines.
These are the pivotal thrusts of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy :
1. The IPS states “For 75 years the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence to support regional peace, security, stability and prosperity”.
US policy makers and think tanks have consistently ignored US role in suppressing Vietnam’s liberation movement; bombed Cambodia; deforestation of Laos. Past US presidency (POTUS) had supported bloody coups in Brunei and assisted in human rights violations during Suharto's Indonesia, assisted regime change in Marco's Philippines and still ambivalent on Taiwan state status.
This delusion is important because many in the region do not consider these actions to have been ‘in support of regional peace’ and ‘stability’. Indeed, some critics say that given this history and the recent US debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq destabilization and regime change in Libya, ASEAN countries are very wary of perpetual US military involvement in the region.
The lesson of the last 75 years for Southeast Asia is that US military involvement often results in failure, chaos and disaster for those countries and regimes that had assisted in pursuing of such US hegemonic design.
2. IPS warns that China is "combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo Pacific and seeks to become the world's most influential power."
ASEAN agrees that the goal of the IPS is to contain China’s rise. US emphasis on a militarist approach is not welcome by ASEAN.
Members of ASEAN have argued that the US build up of its military presence and its thinly-veiled threats to use force against China in the South China Sea make ASEAN members very nervous because of the collateral damage they may suffer from any kinetic conflict thereon.
3. That the IPS will “limit China’s assertive behavior by incorporating a multilateral approach with like-minded partners to strengthen existing norms, rules, and institutions in the region rather than confronting it directly”.
This means that its success depends on the US network of security allies and partners and their willingness to go along with it in confronting China. This remains doubtful, particularly in Southeast Asia, for non-aligned India, constitutionally-restrained Japan and many ‘neutral’ Southeast Asian states, including so-called allies: the Philippines and Thailand.
4. IPS states that "Our objective is not to change China but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates" and Building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share”.
It must be stated that few countries in the region share core US values.
They point out that ASEAN countries like Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam do not share Western democratic ideals like freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and free and fair elections.
This was underscored by the fact that the only Southeast Asian countries invited to the Summit for Democracy 2021 were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste.
5. That the US objective ‘is not to change the PRC’. Instead, it is to build a ‘balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values that we share’.
The IPS is essentially saying that the US-Southeast Asia commonality is fear of China. However, some Southeast Asian states like Cambodia and Laos have made their accommodations with China and do not fear the neighbour and that others will continue to hedge between the two powers because of their national economic interests – not values. Moreover, the recent turmoil and stultifying divisions in US domestic politics undermine the attractiveness of US “democratic values”.
6. ASEAN and the U.S. have fundamentally different visions for the region.
The U.S. vision of an implicitly anti-China, security-oriented Free and Open Indo-Pacific contrasts with ASEAN’s inclusive [including China], less militaristic Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
7. IPS goals will be by “strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments (where the link is external)”; and “supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership (undoubtedly, the link is external)”.
The IPS gives the QUAD and AUKUS as amble examples of their external linkages to US hegemonic objectives.
A critique is that in trying to achieve these objectives simultaneously could create insurmountable tensions.
Analysts have also said that the US and its partners undertook these actions in part because they perceived that ASEAN has been ineffective in dealing with regional security issues like the South China Sea dispute.
Indeed, the U.S. will have to explain satisfactorily to a skeptical ASEAN how its pledge to support ASEAN unity and centrality will mesh with its commitment to “deliver on the Quad” and its promise to support the rise of India and its influence in the region.
Australia's commitment to rules-based order and resistance to Chinese aggression remains firm as the newly-minted premier Anthony Albanese boarded the RAAF's KC-30AB Tokyo-bound with the director-general of the Office of Intelligence, Andrew Shearer, a noted China hawk with supreme connections to Washington networks.
8. National Institute for South China Sea Studies :
The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy largely avoids the hard decisions about whether to pursue national interests or values, whether to prioritize economic statecraft or domestic political concerns, and how to reconcile political objectives with constraints on national resources and coalition-building.
9. Amanda Trea Phua - Senior Analyst in the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore expresses that that Indo-Pacific countries have been here before — and they will be waiting to see if the Biden administration will be able to deliver where previous administrations have failed.
10. To read further:
AUKUS ASIA's NATO and U.S. Blinkered on the Indo-Asia Pacific Basin.
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