PART 1 HERE
a reposting from
Ten leading voices on Trump and US-China relations:
1. Zhu Feng; 2. Yuan Zheng; 3. Zheng Yongnian; 4. Jie Dalei; 5. Wu Xinbo;
6. Yan Xuetong; 7. Huang Jing; 8. Jin Canrong; 9. Jia Qingguo; 10. Hu Wei.
PART 2 begins here:
VI. Yan Xuetong
Name: Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Date of birth: December 1952 (age: 72)
Position: Dean, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.
Sources: The Paper (Dec 2023), SCMP (July 2024), Mearsheimer-Yan debate (Oct 2024), Tsinghua debate (Jan 2025)
1. US-China Relations Under Trump
Trump is poised to escalate the hard-line approach towards China that characterised his first term in office.
This is likely to involve deeper economic decoupling, heightened military pressure on China and impulsive actions that are sure to anger Beijing.
US-China relations are thus set to deteriorate further.
Compounding this trend, escalating populist, nationalistic and jingoistic rhetoric on both sides risks fostering greater animosity between Chinese and American citizens.
Yan: “It may become harder to improve bilateral relations as cultural and social pressure keeps the countries at loggerheads.”
A key distinction from his first presidency is that his administration will now be dominated by younger "right-wing extremists", devoid of Cold War-era experience and espousing an even more aggressive stance towards Beijing.
Although engagement with Washington will remain a priority for China’s leadership, it does not preclude retaliation when deemed necessary.
However, if Trump imposes higher tariffs on Chinese imports, Beijing will have limited retaliatory options.
Yan: “If [Washington] restricts imports of Chinese products, China can only impose a certain degree of restrictions on American products.”
2. Advantages of Trump’s Return
On the plus side for Beijing, Trump shows little interest in ideological or human rights issues and is likely to be less inclined to “intervene in China’s domestic affairs” or subvert its current political system.
Trump’s many years in business don’t necessarily make him “transactional”, as many assume. Furthermore, diplomacy between countries is inherently transactional, as it inevitably involves negotiation.
His “political isolationism” and “economic protectionism” could create rifts within America’s alliance network, prompting allies to balance more carefully between China and the United States.
Although China's international relations may not improve over the next decade, Beijing will benefit from the expected deterioration of US foreign relations.
Yan: “China’s [international] relations may not necessarily improve. But as the US’ strategic relations with other major powers will be undermined, the strategic balance between China and the US will become less favourable to the US.”
There are many areas where US-China cooperation can be expanded.
For instance, Trump’s desire to end the war in Ukraine is closely aligned with Beijing’s own interests.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused substantial geopolitical and economic harm to China, with repercussions likely to endure “for years”.
Although cooperation is possible in this domain, the West often overestimates China’s influence over Russia.
Yan: “How can China influence Russia to make any major policy changes? This is impossible.”
Nevertheless, Beijing's close relationship with Moscow is likely to continue its current trajectory, while a US-Russia rapprochement targeting China remains highly improbably under Trump.
Further meetings between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would be a positive step towards peace on the Korean Peninsula. They should be encouraged, not discouraged.
3. Domestic Economy Comes First
Like Xi, Trump’s attention will be focused primarily on strengthening the domestic economy, thus reducing the likelihood of a military clash or even a proxy war between the US and China.
Unlike Kamala Harris, Trump is less concerned about maintaining America’s global hegemony.
Although accidents may occur in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, there is no risk of their escalating into a full-blown war.
Yan: “China is not about to draw up a timetable for reunification with Taiwan when it is concerned primarily with its own GDP growth.”
The outcome of the great power rivalry between the US and China will be determined not by ideology, but by technological progress, economic strength and government efficiency.
Yan: “In the next four years, the relationship between China and the United States will not only be one of diplomatic competition but also a competition between the two countries in implementing domestic government reforms.”
5. Next 10 Years:
China Unlikely to Surpass America
The economic and military disparity between the two countries is unlikely to change much over the next ten years. It could even widen over the next five years.
Yan: “In terms of defence spending, the US spends over US$900 billion per year. China spends less than 30 per cent of that. The US is also involved in wars and is amassing combat experience. So in the next five years, it is less possible for China to narrow the gap with the US in military strength.”
Yan: “During this period [2024-2034], I don’t think there is a big prospect of China closing the gap in strength with the US. But it is possible to stop the gap from widening.”
For China to start closing the gap with the US, one of the keys will be in limiting the negative effect that the current “anti-globalisation” wave will have on the country’s developmental and foreign policy goals.
Beijing should also shift its diplomatic focus primarily to its neighbourhood and strive to foster friendlier relations with countries in and around its periphery.
VII. Huang Jing
Name: Huang Jing (黄靖)
Year of birth: 1956 (age: 68/69)
Position: Distinguished professor and Director of the Institute for the US and the Pacific, Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies (SAGGAS), Shanghai International Studies University (SISU)
Sources: Noteman (Oct 2024), Observer (Nov 2024), US and Asia-Pacific Briefing (Dec 2024), Global Times (Jan 2025)
Trump’s policy stance is not about severing its international ties, but rather taking full advantage (充分利用) of the interdependence between the US and global economy.
Huang: “He intends to use significantly higher tariffs as leverage, forcing other countries, especially major manufacturing nations, (including US allies […]) to pay taxes in exchange for ‘making America great again’.”
An economic policy of higher tariffs and budget deficits increases the risk of a rapid depreciation of the dollar and a global financial crisis, which would hurt the Chinese economy.
China must continue to promote open trade and engage with multilateral institutions. It should also strengthen trade links with other countries to enhance supply chain resilience
The decline of US manufacturing is a result of US dollar hegemony. Trump will not be able to reindustrialise the US.
Trump’s intention to end the war in Ukraine is to allow the US to focus on China, its primary opponent (主要对手).
Huang: “[Trump and Vance] understand that the first of Putin’s basic demands for peace—Ukraine’s permanent non-membership in NATO—can be fulfilled. The second demand—legitimising Russia's territorial control over parts of Ukraine—can be delayed or left unresolved through negotiations.”
For Trump, Europe’s demand “not to let Putin win” is fundamentally about preventing Putin from advancing west beyond the Dnieper River in Ukraine [which runs through Kyiv]. That can be achieved through negotiations, which makes peace in Europe a real possibility.
Huang: “If Trump were to turn these two strategic ideas into actual policy, there would be both opportunities and, more likely, severe challenges (严峻的挑战) for China.”
A détente in US-Russia relations would then be possible. Huang fears this could create a “Nixon 2.0” scenario.
Huang: “Both Trump and Vance have publicly stated that the US should ‘join hands with Russia’ to counter China. If such a situation arises, China’s security environment would deteriorate drastically (极大地恶化).”
This would influence the behaviour of China’s neighbours:
Without the “strategic dilemma” of both China and Russia as enemies, Japan would feel secure (无后顾之忧) in joining the US in countering China.
India would grow closer to Russia. Feeling less vulnerable to threats from the “Islamic Belt”, it would “undoubtedly” be even tougher (强硬) towards China.
Huang’s other concern is a “Reagan+Thatcher 2.0” scenario. Trump’s return to the White House means that far-right parties (极右势力) may also gain power (得势) in Europe. They share Trump’s worldview, views on protectionism and reconciliation with Russia. They also have a similar hardline stance (强硬立场) towards China.
Huang: “Once the fundamental deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine conflict between the US and Russia is resolved, it is not impossible to envision a resurgence of a Reagan/Thatcher-style coalition from the 1980s, aimed at suppressing the Soviet Union. This time, however, their target would be their common ‘systemic rival’ (制度性竞争对手)—China.”
Trump’s idea of forcing Europe to pay protection fees, his plan to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict quickly, and his unwavering support for Israel will undermine Europe’s security interests.
Faced with Europe’s economic downturn and increasing political fragmentation (政治日益碎片化), transatlantic relations could undergo a critical deterioration (“转折性” 恶化).
Faced with global uncertainty, China should strive to act as a model country, adhering to the Communist Party adage that “it takes a good blacksmith to make good steel” (打铁还须自身硬).
Huang: “China must resolutely demonstrate its determination and ability to defend its peaceful environment — this is its most fundamental responsibility as a major power. China will never allow any war or conflict to enter the Asia-Pacific, particularly in those areas within its immediate vicinity (周边地区).”
China must stand firm in the face of pressure; otherwise, the US will continue to exert pressure to extract further concessions.
Huang: “After all, as a deeply divided, politically polarised society with its industrial capacity hollowed out [...], the US is unlikely to sustain a large-scale, high-intensity conflict with a major power.”
VIII. Jin Canrong
Name: Jin Canrong (金灿荣)
Year of Birth: 1962 (age: 62/63)
Position: Vice Dean and Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); Deputy Director, Centre for American Studies, RUC
Sources: Observer (Nov 2024), Renmin Chongyang (Nov 2024), Peking University (Nov 2024).
With Trump promoting a new form of isolationism (新孤立主义), a new trade war is certain (是肯定的) under Trump.
Jin: “In the short term, the trade war might bring benefits [to America] like boosting tax revenue (会加点税什么的), but in the long term, it is likely to harm the United States because it will cause conflicts with its allies.”
That will be bad for the US in the long run, because of its dependence on allies.
Jin: “Its capabilities are not very strong actually (美国自身的能力并不是很强). If Trump comes to power and engages in isolationism, it will hurt its alliance system. He will gain a little benefit, but it will not be good for the United States in the long run.”
Isolationist diplomacy will weaken ties with allies and could benefit China with regards to Taiwan.
Jin: “Trump’s return to power is relatively favourable to us (比较有利). He is a businessman and has no particular affection (特殊情感) for Taiwan. If we are determined to advance the process of national reunification, Trump is more likely to make a deal (做交易) with us than Harris would have been.”
Even if he wanted to, Trump would be unable to form an anti-China alliance with Russia. The US establishment and European allies would strongly oppose such a move, and Putin knows that close relations with Washington would not outlast Trump.
Trump may try to get Ukraine to make concessions, but Zelensky remains anxious and is unlikely to yield.
Trump’s trade policy is “simplistic and crude” (简单粗暴). It is also unlikely to work.
Jin: “He reduces energy costs by reducing taxes. By creating trade barriers, he [plans to] bring manufacturing back to the United States, so that workers have job opportunities and dignity. Then the capitalists are happy, and the workers are happy, but the question is whether it is feasible?”
Trump’s impact on global trade and stocks is likely to be short-lived.
Jin: “As he takes up power, there will be a shock (一波冲击), including to our stock market. But he is a ‘turtle boxer’ [王八拳: refers to an untrained fist-fighting technique, as opposed to martial arts]. He has no stamina (后面没有后劲); you just need to withstand the first wave.”
Trump’s disdain for democracy, freedom and human rights will damage America’s image globally.
Jin: "He will tear away the facade that once protected America (把美国原来的遮羞布赤裸裸撕开). This [should] serve as a warning (警示) to those in China who still harbour illusions (存有幻想) about the United States.
Ultimately, China is in a far more secure position to confront a Trump presidency than other countries.
Jin: “I don’t think China will have much trouble dealing with any [of these] issues (中国应对的问题不太大), but it is hard to say [the same] for other countries. America is like a big guy messing around in a swimming pool (瞎折腾游泳池). The short guy next to him might drown, but it doesn’t matter to China (中国无所谓). We can just slide a few steps and swim away (慢慢滑两步就游过去了).”
IX. Jia Qingguo
Name: Jia Qingguo (贾庆国)
Year of birth: 1956 (age: 68)
Position: Director, Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University; Standing Committee Member, CPPCC 14th National Committee
Sources: China Review News (March 2024), Phoenix (March 2024), Lianhe Zaobao (Oct 2024)
Under a second Trump presidency, “US-China relations will be very difficult to handle (非常麻烦). US-China relations will probably experience severe friction and confrontation (剧烈的摩擦和对抗).”
Trump could provide more security assistance to Taiwan. There is a real possibility of his abandoning the US’s One-China Policy.
Jia: “He took a call from Tsai Ing-wen right after being elected [in 2016]. […] He then said that the [US’s] ‘One-China policy’ could not be granted for free, meaning that ‘you, China, still have to give me something in return’…. The first signs of [Trump trying to alter the One China Policy] were already quite obvious in the latter part of his term in office.”
Trump’s outdated views (观念上陈旧) on areas like trade, combined with his lack of basic moral principles, (做事不讲基本的道德底线) are a challenge for Chinese policymakers.
Jia: “In my opinion, we must prepare ourselves for how to deal with some of Trump’s immoral and unprincipled behaviour (无道德，无底线的一些做法). Personally, I don't think we should adopt a tit-for-tat approach on this issue (不能采取对等做法). Just because the other side is doing something bad doesn't mean we should follow suit. We must find ways to retaliate without compromising our moral principles.”
There are still many areas in which the US and China can, and must, cooperate. For instance, defusing tensions on the Korean peninsula will only succeed if Beijing and Washington are prepared to work together.
But in general, “it will be very difficult for China to engage in rational and pragmatic exchanges with [Trump].”
X. Hu Wei
Name: Hu Wei (胡伟)
Year of Birth: 1964 (age: 60/61)
Position: Former Professor, Shanghai Municipal Party School; Former Vice-Chairman, Public Policy Research Centre of the Counsellor's Office of the State Council.
Source: WeChat post (7th Nov).
Trump’s win is a victory for the grassroots and a defeat for America’s elites (草根的胜利，精英的失败).
With Trump as president, US-China relations might not deteriorate as some expect. There could instead be a favourable turning point (转机).
Hu: “After all, Trump is a businessman (商人); he can be negotiated with (可交易). Unlike the Democrats who put political values above all else (政治价值观至上), he will forget about principles when he sees profit (见利忘义).”
This is an opportunity (契机) for China to reshape its relationship with the US.
Hu: “Musk, acting in his own interest, will also urge Trump to improve relations. He can act as a broker to grease the wheels of US-China relations (润滑中美关系的掮客).”
Once in office, Trump’s presidency will have a negative impact on the global economy, but there are possible benefits for China.
Hu: “Trump does not care about ideology or political values, and does not split the world into democracies and dictatorships (不以民主和独裁划线)”.
Trump’s attacks on political opponents (打击政治对手) once in office will make the US even more divided.
Hu: “He will threaten the image of the US as a beacon (灯塔国), weaken the core competitiveness of the United States, and run aground (搁浅) the Biden administration’s national strategy of outcompeting China.”
His administration’s behaviour will also cause “cracks to appear” (出现裂痕) between the US and its allies. Western unity will be challenged.
Hu: “The United States' international leadership will decline significantly, the US-centred international system will wane, and China will win greater international space (更大的国际空间).”
Trump’s pressure on Ukraine will be strategically advantageous to Putin.
Hu: “However, the situation of ‘uniting with Russia to fight against China (联俄抗中)’ advocated by some American hawks will not occur. The future of international affairs is moving in China’s favour.”
Trump might change US policy towards Taiwan. He could “make a deal on the Taiwan issue” (在台湾问题上做交易), or force Taiwan to pay “protection fees” (保护费).
Regardless, Trump’s win is “objectively not beneficial to Taiwan independence forces (客观上不利于台独势力)” .
Musk, who may be taken as one indicator of Trump’s likely Taiwan policy, has stated that Taiwan is "an integral part of China".
The bottom line is that Trump’s chaotic policymaking will probably lead to at least some policies that benefit China.
Hu: “In his last term, Trump ended the Obama administration's ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy and ‘Two Oceans Strategy’. In his next term, [though] it may not be his intention, (这不一定是他的主观愿望) he will do something, whether consciously or not, that is objectively beneficial to China.”
PART 1 HERE