PREAMBLE
To mark Trump’s inauguration, this edition presents insights from ten of China’s top US specialists and foreign policy experts on America’s 47th president and his potential impact on Sino-US relations and the world.
These voices span a spectrum from hawkish to moderate and from pessimistic to wishful. Views previously covered in early November have been updated.
Ten leading voices on Trump and US-China relations: 1. Zhu Feng; 2. Yuan Zheng; 3. Zheng Yongnian; 4. Jie Dalei; 5. Wu Xinbo; 6. Yan Xuetong; 7. Huang Jing; 8. Jin Canrong; 9. Jia Qingguo; 10. Hu Wei.
Thomas des Garets Geddes and Paddy Stephens
Jan 20 2025; a reposting from:
PART I
I. Zhu Feng
Name: Zhu Feng (朱锋)
Date of birth: April 1964 (age: 60)
Position: Director, School of International Studies, Nanjing University
Sources: China Review News (Nov. 2024), Lianhe Zaobao (Nov. 2024)
Trump is committed to advancing the agenda of the Republican Party's far-right, solidifying its influence over American politics.
He is also set to strengthen his presidential powers and tighten his control over the US’s “deep state”.
His return marks the dawn of an era of strongman politics (强人政治时代), with an America dominated by populism and driven by self-centred interests.
Trump 2.0 also signals an America more inclined to wield its hegemonic powers to pursue its domestic and foreign policy objectives.
Zhu: “We are about to face an America that is regressive, uglier (更加丑陋) and completely domineering (完全主导一切). Thus, we must all be prepared for this.”
The US appears poised to embrace a return of some kind of “neo-isolationism” (新孤立主义).
Zhu: "This will be a United States [intent on] undermining globalisation, causing a severe regression in free and open international trade. This will be an America characterised by wildly arrogant and unbridled hegemonic behaviour (一个极其嚣张狂妄的霸权主义美国), that relies on its dominance in [military] power, technology and financial capital to redesign how goods and services are traded and how international markets operate, according to its own interests."
This will effectively mark the end of the era of globalisation (全球化时代将基本结束), with global governance mechanisms and international rules set to weaken further.
On the US’s China policy, no significant adjustments are expected.
Zhu: "During the Trump 2.0 era, the US’s China policy will continue its aggressive suppression and containment of our country. Curbing China’s strategic competitiveness and re-widening the power disparity between the US and China will remain the [core] strategy of the second Trump administration."
Nonetheless, a full decoupling of the two countries a remains an unlikely prospect.
The US is likely to keep stoking tensions over Taiwan. However, the risk of the situation spiralling out of control in the near term is low.
Facilitating a ceasefire in Ukraine might emerge as one of the limited opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.
Zhu: “China will not sign a new comprehensive military and security cooperation agreement with Russia and North Korea. China will not return to 1950.”
With so many Americans despising Trumpism, people simply assume that US society will become even more divided and chaotic. In fact, Trump’s election may well lead to more stability.
Law and order will continue to underpin the US's core principles and governance.
Zhu: “Trump is indeed a highly controversial figure. From my years of observing him and understanding his life experiences, Trump is undeniably an 'eccentric genius' (怪才) and a remarkable individual (奇人). The current era of American politics is creating a new chapter in its political history.”
II. Yuan Zheng
Name: Yuan Zheng (袁征)
Date of birth: November 1968 (age: 56)
Position: Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Source: China Review News (July 2024), China Review News (Jan 2025)
Yuan: “Even today, some in China still hold illusions about Trump, believing that his return to power will lead to greater domestic division in America, a disorganised US foreign policy, a pronounced tendency towards neo-isolationism, difficulty in maintaining good relations with allies, and even a knack for deal-making. As a result, they think Trump’s re-election might alleviate the pressure China is facing. However, it was precisely during Trump’s presidency that Sino-US relations plummeted—at one point even reaching the brink of military confrontation.”
The new Trump administration is a more cohesive (具有凝聚力) team than before, with clearer policy goals vis-à-vis China. Trump now has more experience and a better understanding of the “red lines” (底线) in Sino-US competition.
Yuan and Guan Chenglong: “Trump's China policy team will be more stable (稳定), and his approach to our country will also be more predictable (更具可预测性), [thereby] reducing the likelihood of US-China relations being disrupted by unexpected events (突发性事件).”
Trump’s rhetoric now places more emphasis on his personal friendship with China’s leader, which may signal a willingness to negotiate. However, the underlying strategic competition remains, and US-China relations will continue to “spiral downwards” (震荡下行的趋势).
The new administration includes three main factions: 1) the “transactional faction” (交易主义派), which advocates for diplomacy based on interests and trade rather than values; 2) the MAGA faction, Trump loyalists who oppose excessive involvement in international affairs; and 3) neo-conservatives, who promote American primacy and the use of force to spread American values.
Yuan and Guan: ”It is expected that transactionalism (交易主义) will dominate (主导) Trump's foreign and national security policies during his second term, but the ultimate direction of these policies will be determined by the interaction of these three factions.”
Trump will initially focus on the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East rather than on China. He will probably attempt to mediate between Russia and Ukraine early in his term and may even ask China to play a role.
The incoming president prefers bilateral agreements over multilateral ones and may withdraw from or lose interest in engaging with organisations such as the G7 and NATO. This will harm relations between the US and its allies.
Yuan and Guan: “The US is more concerned with domestic issues, and internationally its influence and role have declined. This provides us with an opportunity to move further towards the centre of the world stage (世界舞台中央).”
The new administration will bring significant risks for China. The Trump team regards China as the most significant threat to the US and might even consider forming an alliance with Russia to contain China.
Trump is set to build a “high fence” to strengthen the US’s suppression of China’s technology sector, increase defence spending and concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific region. The new administration is also expected to reduce Sino-US cultural exchanges and tighten visa policies for Chinese students and scholars.
Trump could bully Taiwan into increasing its defence spending to unaffordable levels (入不敷出) and compel advanced semiconductor manufacturers there to expand their investments in the US.
He may also leverage Taiwan, along with Xinjiang and the South China Sea, to pressure China into making concessions on trade.
Yuan and Guan: “We can be sure that, despite [Trump’s] ever-present transactional mindset, his administration will not abandon its approach of 'using Taiwan to contain China'."
III. Zheng Yongnian
Name: Zheng Yongnian (郑永年)
Year of birth: 1962 (age: 62/63)
Position: Founding director of the Institute for International Affairs and X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Sources: Thinking Alone (Dec. 2024), Greater Bay Area Research Institute (Dec. 2024)
With the experience gained from his first term, Trump will be more effective in implementing his policies. He may also adopt a more rational (理性) approach, recognising that politics requires compromise.
The threat of high tariffs may simply be a negotiating tactic, as the risks of inflation could deter Trump from imposing them.
Beijing should now view US diplomacy through the lens of “deals” (交易) and frame US-China relations primarily in terms of trade and finance.
China should demonstrate goodwill towards American scientists, businesses and local government actors with a vested interest in China. US capital and businesses will not abandon the Chinese market as long as it remains profitable.
China should further open its economy to the US and other countries.
Zheng: “Once the American people and capital [choose to interact with China], the ‘China First’ faction in the United States will be isolated. In other words, China's unilateral opening-up policy will lead to the self-isolation of the United States.”
Trump's foreign policy team consists of two main factions:
The “America First” (美国优先) faction, which focuses on competing with China in technology, economics and trade.
The “China First” (中国优先) faction, which emphasises geopolitical and military containment of the PRC, aiming to confront and defeat it.
The incoming president aligns with the “America First” camp. His pressure on China serves primarily as a negotiating tactic. However, the “China First” faction possesses greater foreign policy experience.
Zheng: “If Trump's ‘America First’ policy is hijacked (挟持) and replaced by an extreme ‘China First’ policy, then there could be direct conflict (直接的冲突) between China and the United States.”
Trump is unlikely to focus much energy on the ideological confrontation between democracy and autocracy, nor would such rhetoric be particularly effective in the current context.
Zheng: “Western democracy [...] is at a low point (处于低潮), even experiencing a period of decline. Using so-called 'liberal democratic' ideology to challenge China is unlikely to exert much pressure on China within the international community.”
Chinese diplomats will need to pay attention to Trump’s unique diplomatic style (独特的外交风格), placing particular emphasis on demonstrating “respect” (尊重) towards him.
Zheng: “He needs officials in the background who take the lead in decision-making – that is, he will not actively delegate power to them”.
To prepare for potential military or geopolitical pressure from the new administration, China must continue modernising its military.
Zheng: “When America challenges China’s core interests, such as on the Taiwan issue, China must show strength (展示自己的实力). Only when faced with a show of force will the US become realistic (现实) in its China policy”.
China needs to modernise its military without militarising its economy (必须避免国民经济的军事化), which would lead to funds flowing towards uncompetitive SOEs. The US welcomes the advance of the state and retreat of private enterprise (国进民退) in China.
China must modernise its military while avoiding the “militarisation of its economy” (必须避免国民经济的军事化), which would redirect funds towards uncompetitive state-owned enterprises.
The US views the advance of the state and the retreat of private enterprise (国进民退) in the PRC as a favourable development, one that should be encouraged to undermine China’s strength. Beijing should avoid falling into this trap.
China must reduce its excessive regulation of AI to catch up with the US, where regulation is far less stringent.
If and when the US demonises China, officials must remain composed. Over the past eight years, China’s official responses have at times been overly emotional (过于情绪化).
Zheng: “This not only made the antagonism between the two sides last longer, but also indulged (迁就) the populist and nationalist sentiments of the [Chinese] people too much. If the US demonises China, officials must not be led by their emotions (被自己的情绪牵着鼻子走）”.
IV. Jie Dalei
Name: Jie Dalei (节大磊)
Date of birth: unspecified (age: 40s)
Position: Associate Professor, Peking University
Source: The Chinese Journal of American Studies (Dec. 2024)
America's grand strategy will remain unchanged under the new administration. The country's declining relative power and shifts in domestic public opinion have compelled the US to move away from its long-standing post-Cold War diplomatic strategy of liberal hegemony.
Trump’s first term marked the end of US global leadership, which is now beyond restoration. The US withdrew from multilateral agreements, and America’s commitments lost credibility.
Trump will continue to deliberately present himself as a “madman” to enhance the credibility of his threats, though this approach could prove counterproductive.
Trump will place less importance on promoting democracy, yet may still invoke such values to attack China.
Trump shows personal disdain for alliances, which are America’s “greatest comparative advantage”. However, other members of the new administration do recognise their value.
Jie: "Trump’s return will inevitably heighten allies' concerns (担忧) about the credibility (可信度) of the US [...]. However, in the long term, the evolution of the US alliance system will depend on the complex interplay between the US, its allies and its adversaries, which remains uncertain (不确定性)."
The new administration will probably increase aid to Israel, push for the normalisation of its relations with Saudi Arabia, and exert maximum pressure on Iran.
Jie: “The outcome will inevitably be that the US pays an even higher diplomatic price for supporting the Netanyahu government, the prospect of resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict will become even more remote (遥遥无期), and Iran will have a stronger incentive to develop nuclear weapons.”
Trump’s attacks on the “deep state” is set to undermine the professionalism of the US’s national security agencies.
V. Wu Xinbo
Name: Wu Xinbo (吴心伯)
Year of birth: 1966 (age: 58/59)
Position: Director of the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University
Source: Jiemian News (Nov 2024), Observer (Dec 2024)
Trump will "keep his word" (说到做到) on imposing tariffs on imported goods. Tariffs are not just a negotiation strategy (谈判手段) for Trump, but also a philosophy he believes in (其相信的理念).
Wu: “Whether the tariffs on Chinese goods will reach 60% will [ultimately] depend on the type of goods that the US imports from China. For goods the United States must import from China, the tariffs might not be that high.”
Extreme China hawks (对华极端鹰派) in Trump’s new administration will promote economic decoupling from China and intensify confrontation on security issues, including regarding Taiwan.
Wu: “As a result, Sino-US relations will experience significant fluctuations (大幅度波动) in the next four years, with escalating tensions, intensified confrontation (对抗加剧), and possibly even a major crisis (重大危机).”
The hawks are also likely to advocate for reduced diplomatic engagement and a decline in exchanges between the two countries.
Trump will selectively maintain alliances that he considers to be in America’s interests.
Wu: “[America’s retreat (收缩) into protectionism and unilateralism (保护主义和单边主义)] is bound to impact its alliance system. With Trump’s election, US allies, from Asia to Europe, have felt a sense of unease (感到阵阵寒意). This is precisely why its allies have recently turned to China (往中国跑) as a backup plan (留点后路).”
In its attempt to uphold US hegemony, the country’s approach towards China will become even more vicious (穷凶极恶)).
The space for US-China cooperation on global issues will be greatly reduced.
Given Trump’s scepticism towards climate change, the two will not be able to work together on this issue.
China’s main task in the next four years in its relations with the US is to minimise losses (止损).
Wu: “[Our task is] not to expand cooperation or seek stability, because both are impossible tasks (不可能的任务). In the coming years, we must instead focus on minimising losses and preparing for worst-case scenarios.
Having remoulded the Republican party in his image, Trump will now try to reshape the federal government to ensure his political legacy.
Wu: “It is clear that Trump is grooming Vance as his successor. We must pay attention to the ‘Trump system’ under construction.”
To be continued in PART 2…….
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