PREAMBLE
In an interview by The Paper (澎湃新闻), Yan Xuetong (阎学通), China’s international relations scholar, looks back at some of the predictions made in his book “Inertia of History: China and the World by 2023”, and provides an assessment of the major structural changes currently underway and underpinning world affairs.
Notwithstanding that China has gained “greater moral appeal 道义感召力” and that it is imperative that “on major issues concerning the future of humanity and the direction of the world, we must take a clear and firm position, hold the international moral high ground, and unite and rally the overwhelming majority in our world 在关乎人类前途命运和世界发展方向的重大问题上，要旗帜鲜明、站稳立场，牢牢占据国际道义制高点，团结争取世界大多数“, as articulated by Xi Jinping at the recent Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, December 27-28, 2023.
Further expressed was that China has gained “greater moral appeal 道义感召力” and that it is imperative that “on major issues concerning the future of humanity and the direction of the world, we must take a clear and firm position, hold the international moral high ground, and unite and rally the overwhelming majority in our world 在关乎人类前途命运和世界发展方向的重大问题上，要旗帜鲜明、站稳立场，牢牢占据国际道义制高点，团结争取世界大多数“.
Reiterated was “that great transformation is accelerating across the world. Changes of the world, of our times, and of historical significance are unfolding like never before, and the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation 世界大变局加速演进，世界之变、时代之变、历史之变正以前所未有的方式展开，世界进入新的动荡变革期” and that “China faces new strategic opportunities in its development 我国发展面临新的战略机遇”.
Xi further expressed states that “China calls for an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization 我们倡导平等有序的世界多极化和普惠包容的经济全球化”.
In addressing these multifaceted issues, Beijing would shift its diplomatic focus primarily to its neighbourhood and strive to foster friendlier relations with countries in and around its periphery - as Yan Xuetong presented his thoughts for the 2024 new year.
IN 2024, THE WORLD WILL HEAD TOWARDS MORE CONFRONTATION UNDERPINNED BY DE-GLOBALISATION (EXCERPTS)
Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Interview by The Paper (澎湃新闻) – 29 December 2023
I. On the predictions Yan made in 2013 in his book “Inertia of History: China and the World by 2023”
“The biggest surprise in [my] prediction errors was the decline of liberal values and the rise of populism, with the United States becoming the main force undermining liberal international norms. International relations theory suggests that a leading power will defend the international norms it has established in order to preserve its dominant position and that it is the rising power that will demand that [existing] international norms be changed.”
“However, what we are seeing in today's international relations contradicts this theoretical principle. After the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted liberal international norms as well as the international normative principle that human rights trump [national] sovereignty. Today, [however,] the US is pursuing a protectionist economic policy involving decoupling and the cutting off of supplies. And politically, it is providing protection to the anti-humanitarian massacre of Palestinian civilians [杀戮巴勒斯坦平民的反人道主义行为]. By mistakenly assuming in [my] book that the US would [continue to] put into practice the liberal values that it has advocated, I predicted incorrectly that liberal international norms would continue to be mainstream by 2023. However, the reality is that the norms of both free trade and human rights have weakened considerably [大大弱化了].”
“Underestimating the rise of populism also led me to predict incorrectly that East Asian countries would persist in adopting a hedging strategy between China and the United States. Under the dominance of populist xenophobia, the Trump administration defined ‘economic security’ as a strategic national security interest. This policy prompted many countries to follow suit by making the safeguarding of ‘economic security’ one of the starting points in the formulation of their foreign strategies. This has led to the adoption of ‘de-globalisation policies’ [去全球化政策] that reduce international economic cooperation.”
“For example, some East Asian countries have broadened the basis of their security cooperation with the United States by characterising 'economic security' as a security interest, thereby altering their [previous] hedging strategy of 'economic dependence on China and security dependence on the United States' [‘经济靠中国、安全靠美国'的对冲战略]. The most typical example of this is the South Korean government's announcement in 2021 that it is a partner of the US in its 'economic security alliance' and its joining Washington’s 'Chip 4' partnership aimed at curbing China's digital and technological advances. In 2023, the South Korean government went so far as: to criticise our strategic cooperation with Russia and North Korea; to say that the issue over Taiwan is an international one; and to get involved in discussions regarding the South China Sea.”
II. On Yan’s prediction that a bipolar world order would emerge by 2023
“Since 2019, UN Secretary General Guterres, French President Macron, and Singapore's former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong have each said that the world is developing into a bipolar configuration. International media have already begun to refer to China as a superpower and Vladimir Putin has called China an economic superpower. Today, no one in the international community believes that there is another superpower other than China and the United States. With only two superpowers, this bipolar pattern is an objective reality, while a multipolar one is a goal advocated and strived for by many countries. Of course, there is still a gap between China's overall national power [综合国力] and that of the United States. However, when the Soviet Union was a global superpower, there was also a power gap with the US and bipolarity was readily acknowledged then. When assessing the global landscape, one must look not only at how big the power gap is between China and the United States, but also at how big the gap is between these two countries and other major powers.”
III. On great power competition and the role of smaller countries and multilateral organisations in the world
“The role played by great power competition in shaping the current global landscape is obvious. But the more important factor affecting these changes is the preferences of the great powers’ decision makers with regard to their competition strategies. That is, what kind of strategies they use to compete:
If they have a preference for war, the current global landscape will change within a few years, as was the case [after] World War I and World War II.
If they prefer a strategy of ideological expansion, the scale of proxy wars will increase and the current landscape could last 10 years or more, albeit with a dynamic level of change.
If they choose to compete through technological innovation, the current global landscape will achieve a certain amount of stability and the current landscape could last for 20 years or more.”
“Small and medium-sized countries as well as international organisations play a much smaller role than the big countries do in shaping the current global landscape. Over the next five years, the power gap between [on the one hand] small and medium-sized countries and [on the other] China and the US will widen rather than narrow and multilateral cooperation through international organisations will be less effective in shaping the global landscape. Their declining role does not mean that these actors lack the capacity to shape the international order. Small and medium-sized countries as well as international organisations can use collective power to bring about changes in the international order. For example, strategic competition between China and the US puts pressure on small and medium-sized countries to pick a side. Therefore, they [can] respond to this new bipolar landscape by using the collective power of the Global South in an attempt to become an object of US-China competition. Objectively speaking, the emergence of the Global South has reduced the level of Sino-American competition in these countries.”
IV. On the world’s current trend towards de-globalisation and China’s response
“Globalisation since the end of the cold war has centred on political democratisation and economic marketisation. Since Brexit, economic de-globalisation [经济逆全球化] has manifested itself in policy acts such as decoupling, de-risking and internal circulation [内循环] in the name of 'economic security', while political de-globalisation [政治逆全球化] has manifested itself in the non-compliance with constitutional provisions, [such as] the refusal to accept election results, and the non-observance of humanitarian principles, [such as] the massacre of civilians. There is currently no force in sight that could halt, let alone reverse, this growing trend towards de-globalisation [逆全球化日益增强趋势]. The reason why this trend cannot be stopped is the lack of a leading force behind globalisation. At present, no country has the ability to assume such a responsibility. At the same time great power rivalry prevents them [i.e. the great powers] from providing a collective leadership [集体领导].”
“In the context of this growing trend towards de-globalisation and in order to reduce security and economic risks, countries are adopting a strategy of ‘sweeping the snow off their own doorsteps and not caring about the frost on the roofs of others’ [各家自扫门前雪，莫管他人瓦上霜]. The COVID-19 pandemic was a security threat to everyone on this planet. [But,] not only did some major powers fail to join forces in combating it, they even went so far as to attack one another in order to protect themselves. In future, the major powers will be more inclined to adopt self-protective security policies and less inclined to engage in global cooperation.”
“In the face of this trend towards de-globalisation, if our country is to reduce its security and economic risks, it will have to intensify reforms across all departments [加大各部门的改革力度] in order to adapt to this new situation. From the point of view of diplomacy, US-China competition will be a long-term trend and its impact on our international environment is already a permanent feature. Whether or not we can reduce the international risks we currently face will depend in large part on the environment in and around our periphery [i.e. neighbourhood]. The [ancient] idea of ‘befriending distant states while attacking those nearby’ [远交近攻] is clearly not in line with current realities. I personally believe that what we need now is a strategy of good-neighbourliness [睦邻友好策略]. Whether or not we can set our minds on putting [China’s] periphery diplomacy at the forefront of our diplomatic work will depend on [our implementing] major diplomatic reforms.”
