1 Introduction
The relocation of the national capital (Ibu Kota Negara, or IKN) Jakarta to East Kalimantan is perhaps the most ambitious government project - both technocratically and politically - in Indonesia history.
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. The concept of the archipelago, incorporating land and adjoining water as part of the national sovereignty, is a core Indonesian belief, with its own term: Wawasan Nusantara.
Nusantara is reflected in its slogan: locally integrated, globally connected, universally inspired where the new capital city aspires to be the most sustainable city in the world, a symbol of national identity, and the driving force of Indonesia’s economy in the future.
2 Internal Implications
i) First, the new capital city is expected to stimulate economic growth as to date, Java contributes 58.49 per cent to Indonesia’s GDP, of which 20.85 per cent comes from Jakarta (BPS, 2018).
In the long term, Nusantara is expected to become an economic Super Hub driving the economy of the nation and is projected to be able to support Indonesia’s GDP target of USD$180 billion and create 4,811,000 jobs in 2045.
It is also expected to boost East Kalimantan’s economic performance to improve significantly between 2021 to 2030 when the province’s economy will grow from 2.38 per cent to 6.3 percent. The poverty rate projected to fall from 6.54 per cent to 5.92 per cent and the unemployment rate will drop from 6.8-7 per cent to 6–6.5 per cent.
ii) As Nusantara is to be a new epicentre of economic growth outside Java, crucially, urban regeneration may entails imminent negative impacts, (World Bank, About Urban Regeneration) like the possibility of a widening social inequality, (see UN 2020, Inequality in a Rapid Changing World), particularly due to ‘speculative urbanism’ and, with an increasingly new narrative, to question specifically whether this is an ‘internal colonisation’ process where basically the move to a new location has excluded local and indigenous communities from the planning process - and as an internal colonial project in disguise - threatens their land, culture and livelihoods.
iii) Furthermore, there is a risk that investing in upgrading the environmental condition of a given part of the city may probably lead to neglect in other nearby towns, (refer to OECD 2011, Cities and Green Growth: a conceptual framework).
iv) Though the capital is designated as a forest city and a smart and intelligent city with relevancy to the Kalimantan biodiversity, the green agenda to represented a net-zero carbon emissions design may be a challenge.
However, the National Capital Authority (IKN) hopes for the role of biologists to support the application of the environmentally friendly forest city concept in the new capital.
There is a need to be reminded that with the new city being built in the country’s coal-mining heartland, coal is the most likely energy source for such manufacturing, putting Indonesia’s emissions reduction targets likely at risk.
v) Further, the provision of extensive public transportation and active mobility and the commitment even to allocate at least 75% of green spaces in the Government Area may contradict the urban green agenda priority.
Leader of the Smart Transportation System Master Plan Development Team had indicated that vehicles used will also be eco-friendly and not likely to produce emissions. The Business Director of the state-run electricity company PT PLN in Sumatra-Kalimantan Regional, Adi Lumakso, has said that the electricity needs in the new capital city (IKN) Nusantara would use both new and renewable energy-based power plants that produce no emissions.
vi) The new capital city will be governed by a special authority whose chief is directly appointed and dismissed by the president. Despite critics over the weak commitment to establish a democratised government, this framework will have the advantage of avoiding political tensions created by local elections (Pilkada). The special capital region is a province having full authority to govern it jurisdictional boundary while enjoying strong budgetary support.
This shall, if manifested onto a socio-economic foundation, allows policymakers to support land-use rights for poverty reduction and food security purposes, seek peaceful resolutions to land conflicts, promote sustainable farming of energy crops, and increase support for research on second- and third- generation biofuels, (read the broader implications and impact upon communities, Prapimphan Chiengkul, 2022 ISEAS Perspective).
Designed by sculptor Nyoman Nuarta - the garuda -with its wings spread wide symbolically protecting the palace and its residents.
The reallocation of Indonesia capital to Kalimantan has initiated an awareness,and immediate assessments, to the many activities determined to identify possible spatial economic spread effects to Malaysia and the southeast Asia archipelago; the possible consideration to reframe the Strait of Malacca dilemma; and an awakening rethinking of the southeast Asia bluewater basin strategic repositioning.
3 External Effects
A] In the case of Malaysia, there has to be in place new strategic master plans for Kapit and Bakun to benefit from Indonesia’s relocation of its capital to Kalimantan.
The Regional Corridor Development Authority (Recoda) has already indicated that Kapit will be the closest urban centre in Sarawak to the new sited capital in East Kalimantan, and that a redevelopment plan has to be considered for future linkage to its neighbour city central.
That a masterplan is also in place to develop Bakun, which is also close in proximity to the border. Among the benefits could be in the form of supplying electricity to the new capital from Sarawak’s dams, including Bakun. Further, a consideration to develop a lakeside township as well as an island township to be executed in a systematic manner so as to enable an attraction to potential investors to go to Bakun.
The Malaysian Armed Forces will incrementally increase security outposts, adding new regiments, to control cross-border crossings, including transborder smugglings to neighbouring countries as the new Nusantara city progresses on its urbanisation in the archipelago.
While being protective, and at loss in serial systemic odious practices and as a groveling governance, Malaysia is overshadowed by her Nusantara neighbour where a country of islands but united by seas with a vision of unity that embraced diversity.
B] With the new Indonesian capital sites in the Borneo island of Kalimantan, and the eventually development of a transitory seaport hub, the future of coastline development, and Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas along the Strait of Malacca would be affected. In the wakes of changing sea routes and the deepwater geopolitical dimensions, the Lombok-Makassar Straits (Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lane Route II) may become the primary maritime trade route, (read also Deepwater Supply Chains).
C] A new sea route bypassing the Strait of Malacca and Singapore would have tremendous changing seafaring effects, and politico-economics impact, on the relationship of these two countries with their existing trading partners.
For that little red dot of a place, Singapore has had an outsize influence and strategic importance in Southeast Asia. At the southern tip in the Strait of Malacca, it controls a vital access point for the maritime trade routes connecting Europe, Africa, and Asia, (World Bank); now, her strategic positioning in the southeast Asia archipelago may require a changing posture.
As Nusantara will have an international seaport, the new Indonesian capital might affect the supremacy of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route as the foremost maritime route in Southeast Asia. Presently, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route is the second busiest in the world after the Dover Strait in the United Kingdom. Projecting ahead, unless those East Asian economic powerhouses (China, Japan and south Korea) stop importing their petroleum from the Middle East, the construction of Nusantara will not significantly impact maritime traffic flow through key waterways in Southeast Asia, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
On one aspect, not only is the Strait of Malacca-Singapore sea route being the shortest one connecting East Asian economic giants with their West Asian petroleum suppliers, but also annually, 30 per cent of the world's oil shipment passes through these waterways. Further, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route witnesses 22 times more shipments than the Sunda or Lombok-Makassar route. Then, there are only two major ports along the coast of Makassar Strait — Port of Semayang in Balikpapan and Samarinda.
On the other hand, Sabah’s ambition to becoming the region’s logistics hub takes a huge step forward with a link-up with China’s Shandong Port Overseas Development Group, the biggest port operator in the world:
Sabah’s state-owed POIC Sabah Sdn Bhd and its industrial park and ports in Lahad Datu, with the signing of a Strategic Collaboration Agreement, are now in the company of a global logistics player that marks a major step towards realizing its vision as the hub of logistics, resource amalgamation and manufacturing of the BIMP-EAGA region. The Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area is a cooperation initiative established in 1994 to spur development in the remote and less developed areas of the four participating Southeast Asian countries.
In a sense, learning from the Malacca Straits experience, Malaysia is taking advantage of the establishment of Nusantara by developing the east coast of Sabah, which is a vital entry and exit point into Makassar Strait, as a shipping hub.
According to Shariman Lockman, a Senior Analyst in the Foreign Policy and Security Studies program at the ISIS Malaysia, it is a belief that Malaysia has a “special” relationship with China (see Geoff Wade, Xi Jinping and the Sabah enigma, The Strategist 24/10/2013); or, at least, more special than its neighbours in the region can claim, as seen in the relationship between China and Sabah.
China’s exerted claims on most of the South China Sea within its territorial waters, and hegemony America’s rejection of that assertion, have invoked rivalries between big powers. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which China has attempted to win over, are embroiled in constant tension in this geopolitical maneuvering contention:
South-East Asia region has no clear battle-lines but attraction of big powers competition only makes USA-China rivalry more complex, and intense. Their geoeconomic ties with the region also introduce more diplomatic awareness and foreign affairs tightness which, fraught with combative military competitiveness intent, far from being peaceful, (read firesstorms, US blinkened on the Indo-Asia-Pacific basins).
A new geopolitical landscape with the formation of AUKUS encircling the archipelago with deepen submarine deployments, the big power plays in the southeast Asia water basins have thus churned a new wave for future conflicts - Destined for War - amidst, and within, the archipelago, inevitable:
The trilogy is here:
SABAH