1] INTRODUCTION
The European Union and China are two of the biggest trading partners in the world. The European Union and China are committed to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The EU's current position on China, endorsed by the European Council in 2020, is based on the known triptych: partner, competitor and systemic rival
However, new challenges and opportunities as acknowledged by China has shifted over time, more so after the Russian transborder special military operation in Ukraine, (read Ukraine - the Geopolitical Pivot for the underlying causes, initial conflict and evolving courses: Karaganov, 2023; Lavrov, 2023, Genuine Multilateralism and Diplomacy vs the “Rules-Based Order” ).
2] IMPACT on EURO-SINO RELATIONS
One direct, and obvious, negative impact that the conflict has had on the EU is its push for strategic autonomy, (read previous On Geoeconomics posts that have indicated the European nation states’ perspectives; China’s posture on the EU positioning; and China and Europe.
Chinese experts tend to agree that Russia’s Ukraine operation may have initially created a certain amount of unity among EU member states and increased their desire for greater strategic autonomy. However, as the conflict unfolded, and military activities expanded, other various factors have been preventing the EU strategic autonomy approach from moving forward.
3] EURO-SINO ISSUES
The major hindrance lies on the fact that encamped EU has economic and military dependence on the US (Foreign Affairs, 7/03/2023). Then, there is the increased influence that certain US-leaning countries have now acquired within the EU since the outbreak of the conflict,(Zhang Jian).
A broad perspective in China appears to be that so long as the Russo-Ukrainian conflict could not be resolved, the EU's dependence on the US will continue and the short- to medium-term prospects for greater EU strategic autonomy will remain quite bleak.
Singularly, the delay implementation of such EU strategic autonomy may be an unfavourable geopolitical outcome on China. On the other hand, geostrategically, a prolonged European skirmish shall delay or forestall the US hegemon venturing into the Asia-Pacific in seek of more advancing adventures.
4] THE FUTURE
Since the European Union and China are committed to a comprehensive strategic partnership, both parties can now more closely to tackle global and regional challenges, and in the process shall remain committed to continuing engagement.
In 2020, China overtook the U.S.’s position as the EU’s main trading partner, and in 2022, China was the EU’s largest source for imported goods and its third largest market for exported goods; by 2023, China accounted for 9% of EU goods exports and 20% of EU goods imports.
Therefore, ensuring reciprocity, achieving a level-playing field, and addressing asymmetries in the relationship is a matter of priority, more likely the EU will continue to conduct its policy towards China in line with a more realistic, assertive and multi-faceted approach. This approach will ensure that relations with this strategic partner shall then be set on a fair, balanced and mutually beneficial course from EU's viewpoint.
Also, China is, as a cooperation partner in alignment with EU on certain objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU shall needs to find a balance of interests. At one angle, China is an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance, (see Global Civilisation Initiative and 中国式现代化 Chinese path to modernization).
5. CONCLUSION
Therefore, on this evolving landscape, EU shall require a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling, not only its principled defence of interests and values, but also long-term how to balance in Europe’s hinterland as a viable and sustainable identity with a transatlantic empire on one pond and another rising power on the Asia-Pacific basin.
This blog is resurrected at a time during Blinken's China encounter whence China is seen deploying a Sun Tzu tactic in outflanking Biden’s outreach in the Far East by deploying her premier Li Qiang to Europe in solidifying alliances, thereby sends out a clear message that China attaches great importance to its relations with Europe, too (see also Rebooting Europe's China Strategy, Institut Montaigne, May 2022; whilst E.U. Takes Aim at China in Proposed Economic Strategy, New York Times 20/06/2023).
Here's one assessment on the vitality of Euro-Sino relationship prior to premier Li Qiang visit to EU:
Author: Jian Junbo (简军波) – Deputy director of the Centre for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University.
Background: Academic. Focus: EU/EU-China relations. PhD Fudan University (2006).
Published: January 2023
Source: The Paper
“Despite the real need and potential for cooperation, China-EU relations may nevertheless encounter important challenges in 2023. Amidst a number of intractable structural differences, the development of bilateral relations could suffer major setbacks both in terms of geopolitical conflicts and at the level of economic relations.”
Summary:
1. Strategic autonomy¹:
Positive aspects:
Benefits the development of EU-China relations by freeing the EU from the influence of “third parties” (i.e. the US).
In line with China’s desire for a multipolar world order.
Negative aspects:
Has a strong anti-China element to it:
Quote: “Although European strategic autonomy forms to some extent the basis for China-EU strategic cooperation, it is nevertheless a double-edged sword for China-EU relations and is to a certain extent an important causal factor in the conflict over values between China and Europe. Within Europe's strategic autonomy, safeguarding Europe's vision of a self-proclaimed ‘rules-based and liberal’ international order, upholding the authoritativeness of European norms and consolidating the transatlantic ‘values’ alliance are its major concerns. Against this backdrop, the inevitable clash of values between the two powers that are China and Europe, which adhere to different social systems, ideologies and civilisational ideals, is bound to occur in the context of the above-mentioned EU perspective and will manifest itself through concrete confrontational incidents.” [Comment: It is common for Chinese scholars to use “EU” and “Europe” interchang
ably].
Outlook:
The EU’s desire for greater strategic autonomy is still present. However, the war in Ukraine has had a negative impact on its development.
2. EU-China – Prospects for 2023:
The EU’s recent tilt towards Washington will remain and EU-China relations may suffer.
Quote 1: “As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, Europe's negative feelings towards China caused by the differences in stance taken by both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will accumulate and develop into specific policies and actions towards China. This will include a certain amount of cooperation with the US in its efforts to suppress China. However, strategically speaking, Europe will not develop its own independent policies to contain China.”
Quote 2: “The difference in stance taken by the EU and China on the Russia-Ukraine issue has led to a growing distrust of China and, to a certain extent, to a closer alignment with the US's position on China.” (from a different article)
Europe is too weak to jeopardise its economic ties with China. The pull of the Chinese market will remain. However, the EU’s decoupling from China in certain areas is expected to continue.
The EU and its member states may strengthen their relations with Taiwan, Japan and other Indo-Pacific countries, and may continue to interfere in China’s “internal affairs”.
Potential areas of cooperation still abound.
3. Suggestions:
Against the backdrop of Sino-US rivalry, Beijing should place its relations with Europe as one of its top foreign policy priorities.
Despite their increasing closeness, China should make sure not to equate Europe with the US.
Beijing should do its upmost to ease tensions and not provoke conflicts with actors at all levels in Europe (不主动激发矛盾) on condition that China’s core national interests are not at stake.
China should consider focusing its efforts both on those member states that are “friendlier” (更为友好) towards China and on those countries that have a considerable impact on Sino-European relations (e.g. France, Germany and members of the Visegrad Group).
When China’s core interests are involved, China should be ready to fight back by adopting countermeasures at the economic and diplomatic levels.
reposted from
Sinification
ON GEOECONOMICS:economics with GEOPOLITICAL dimensions