The China-Palestine Reconciliation Agreement
Palestinian responses to the Beijing Declaration
PREAMBLE
HERE are how Palestinian officials and observers have discussed the reconciliation agreement recently signed in Beijing by Fatah, Hamas, and 12 other Palestinian factions.
In a way, the “Beijing Declaration” is the first formal agreement to have been reached by the factions since the onset of the Israel-Gaza war in October 2023. Preceeding high-level meetings in February and April, held respectively in Moscow and Beijing, have had concluded without achieving much visible results.
Indeed, the declaration joins a long list of accords aimed at Palestinian reconciliation disputes that embraced the elections in 2005-2006 which, however, had resulted in a breakdown of cooperation between the major factions.
Raphael ANGIERI (李少轩) scripted the following conclusion part where the main text - with 24 annotated footnotes - is accessible HERE.
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As the war in Gaza grinds on, at the time of writing, unabated, leaving much of the Gaza Strip in ruins and exposing a large civilian population to bombardment, displacement, disease, and famine, the issuance of the Beijing Declaration has generated renewed attention to the inter-Palestinian reconciliation file, both internationally and among regional stakeholders.
In the wake of the agreement’s publication on July 23, the major players in the reconciliation process, Fatah and Hamas, have continued to express public support for the goal of a unity government. Anonymous statements by Fatah officials, however, have called into question the seriousness of the party’s commitment to the declaration, depicting it as a diplomatic move aimed at currying favor with China, even as dissident voices within Fatah, the PLO, and the PA insist upon a real need to begin forming a national unity government and inclusive leadership framework.
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Hamas, for its part, has been vocal in endorsing specific provisions of the declaration, most importantly that of establishing a unity government to administer a Gaza in crisis. That said, the movement has been equivocal about the ideological concessions it is willing to make in pursuit of that goal, for example, recognizing UN resolutions on the nature of a future Palestinian state.
Palestinian observers have debated the extent and significance of areas of apparent convergence signaled in the text of the Beijing Declaration, noting that agreement by Hamas to respect UN resolutions on Palestine would represent a shift toward the PLO’s position, while recognition by Fatah of Palestinians’ right to resist Israeli occupation would constitute a re-alignment toward the position held by Hamas. However, no clear consensus exists among analysts as to whether these concessions indicate real changes in viewpoint or simply rhetorical tactics meant to offer the appearance of unity.
With regard to the structural forces at play in the issuance of the agreement, as well as the likelihood that this agreement could result in the brokering of a unity government, Palestinian observers point to critical dynamics both internal and external.
Hamas, ostracized by international powers such as the United States, and still bogged down in a war which has been disastrous for its constituents in Gaza, is thought to be looking for ways to remain a player—even if in a diminished or indirect capacity—in post-war governance, ideally without compromising on core commitments including armed resistance. Fatah is under pressure from the Palestinian street and within the PLO to transcend partisan disputes, demonstrate solidarity with those suffering in Gaza, and reform its governance structures so that it can increase its impact on the ground. At the same time, as Fatah seeks to maximize its influence in Gaza on the “day after,” it faces the uncertainty of a US presidential election which may tilt international favor toward or against its participation in post-war governance. Taking part in the reconciliation process is thus seen as a means for Fatah to gesture at unity while hedging its bets.
Within these dynamics, the China factor is at once critical and ambiguous. Both Fatah and Hamas are thought to take an active interest in ingratiating themselves with China, as its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Middle East, and the Palestinian issue in particular, continues to intensify and break new ground. Given the country’s role in Saudi-Iran normalization and the vocal support it has given to Palestinian interests amidst the war in Gaza, China is perceived to be a potentially consequential player going forward. That said, China’s own motivations for involving itself in the reconciliation file — not to mention the leverage it can bring to bear or the lengths it is willing to go in pursuit of a resolution — have not received significant coverage from Palestinian observers, beyond noting the country’s apparent desire to establish itself as an alternative to the United States in a high-profile diplomatic arena.
Raphael ANGIERI (李少轩) is an independent foreign policy analyst specializing in the political economy of China, Sino-Arab relations, and Palestinian politics. He holds a B.Sc. in International Affairs from Georgetown University and an M.Sc. in International Development from Sciences Po Paris. Raphael previously served as a Fulbright ETA Fellow in Baqa, a partitioned town on the Green Line, and has nearly a decade of field experience between China and the Middle East.
Other articles associated with Middle East geopolitical dimensions are available in the
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