An excerpt from Foreign Policy’s China Brief.
The Pentagon Focuses on Hypothetical Taiwan Conflict
A man watches a news program about Chinese military drills surrounding Taiwan, on a giant screen outside a shopping mall in Beijing on Oct. 14, 2024.Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images
The U.S. Defense Department is becoming more focused on a hypothetical conflict with China—at the same time as U.S. President Donald Trump’s policies are undercutting alliances in the Asia-Pacific.
The Pentagon has outlined plans to reconfigure the U.S. military for great-power struggles instead of sporadic counterinsurgencies. An internal guidance memo from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, which appears to be based on the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, identifies China as the United States’ “sole pacing threat.” Deterring a Chinese seizure of Taiwan is a top priority, and the United States is expected to “assume risk in other theaters” accordingly.
The reconfiguration draws inspiration from the controversial overhaul of the U.S. Marine Corps in 2020, which reoriented the branch from its focus on tactical flexibility toward becoming an island-hopping force in a Pacific conflict. But this strategy only makes sense if one believes that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is inevitable in the next few years and that a wider war with the United States would follow.
This idea has been a fixation in Washington for years. Just last week, U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo brought up the possibility of China invading Taiwan in 2027, the date of the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Paparo’s subordinate, Gen. Ronald Clark, echoed similar concerns in a recent interview. To his credit, Paparo correctly stated that Chinese President Xi Jinping has not actually called for the PLA to invade Taiwan in 2027 but instead demanded that it be ready to do so by that date.
Xi’s ask to the PLA might seem threatening, but it doesn’t necessarily indicate immediate danger. Countries can bloviate about seizing territory for decades and then suddenly act on it, whether it’s Russia in Ukraine or Argentina in the Falklands. But Chinese leaders often invoke Taiwan as a metonym for PLA readiness, and threatening Taiwan is something of a political necessity for every Chinese leader.
Additionally, U.S. leaders don’t seem to have considered how recent events—especially the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s ongoing purge of the military over widespread corruption—might have affected the PLA’s readiness, reform plans, and budgets, all of which could push back a 2027 timeline.
Trump’s own agenda, however, seems to differ from that of China hawks in his administration. Trump is “confident” that Xi will not invade Taiwan during his second term, according to U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Despite the shift in Pentagon strategy, Trump himself has given little attention to the Asia-Pacific, repeatedly dismissing Taiwan’s importance and attempting to extort money from U.S. allies for defense contributions.
U.S. allies in the region are walking a fine line between paying off Trump — both directly and with possible trade concessions — and dealing with domestic constituencies that are angry with Washington’s antics.
Australia’s election on May 3 saw a firm rejection of Trumpism, which is worrying given the country’s key logistical role in any conflict with China and for the prospects of the submarine deal between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
That said, Beijing’s saber-rattling could drive countries back into Washington’s arms. China has somewhat curbed its nationalistic tone lately, but it is still engaging in flag-waving contests with the Philippines and Vietnam at sea and threats against countries that side with the United States in the trade war.
Ultimately, a more divided Asia-Pacific may not work to Trump’s advantage. The United States needs allies in Asia more than China does, and come 2027 countries may abstain from taking sides between two equally unreliable and belligerent superpowers.