PREAMBLE
Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛) has a notably unorthodox background. Trained in Chinese literature, his doctoral research explored how the classic Song-dynasty poetics treatise, Canglang’s Remarks on Poetry (沧浪诗话), has been interpreted and culturally reframed within Anglophone scholarship. After completing his PhD in 2011, he made a remarkable shift in focus, joining the prestigious Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), where he began analysing cross-Strait relations and political developments in the Republic of China (ROC). How such a transition was possible is not readily evident. He is now an Associate Professor at the University of International Relations in Beijing, known for its close ties with China’s Ministry of State Security. This may account for his apparent reluctance or inability to engage directly with foreign China watchers such as myself, particularly on so sensitive a subject as Taiwan.
I found his book talk on cross-Strait relations (below) fascinating, as it sheds light on some of the debates and developments in strategic thinking—objectionable or otherwise—currently underway in China. Although Presidents Trump and Lai Ching-te are described as highly unpredictable figures capable of upending the status quo on a whim, Zhong, like many of his colleagues, also highlight both Beijing’s growing capacity to deter such behaviour, and the US’s intent and ability to prevent Taipei from straying too far beyond Brijing’s red lines. Furthermore, there appears to be growing scepticism in China about the resolve of the US and its allies to intervene should a cross-Strait conflict ever break out, alongside increasing confidence in the PRC’s ability to prevail. As political scientist Zheng Yongnian (郑永年) recently observed: “The United States would find it difficult to sustain such an asymmetric conflict. For the US, Taiwan is merely one component of its broader geopolitical [strategy], representing the interests of a small minority. For mainland China, by contrast, it would be a war over sovereignty—one that reflects the will of its entire people.”
Rather than simply advocating that Beijing continue its “salami slicing” tactics towards Taiwan, as Zheng does, more hardline scholars like Zhong appear to favour the recent “Kinmen model”—put simply, seizing every possible opportunity to “take a mile when given an inch”—an approach that sits uneasily with his recommendation to prevent crises from spiralling out of control.
Equally uneasy is the stance taken by Zhong and others who, despite frequent insistence that China has no intention of exporting its political model abroad, actively extol the virtues of the PRC’s “whole-process people’s democracy” while simultaneously seeking to discredit Western-style democratic systems by denouncing what they see as their inherent flaws. The line between praising a system and promoting it is a thin one.
— Thomas
Key Points (Part 1)
Lai Ching-te’s recent “New Two-State Theory” represents a shift from the DPP’s earlier “Nation-Building Theory”, reducing emphasis on formal independence in favour of de facto separation through reliance on external support, particularly from the US.
“Internationalisation of the Taiwan issue” will probably become a key battleground in US–China rivalry, as shown by debates over UN Resolution 2758 and Western claims that it does not endorse the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
Beijing faces a “communications predicament”: it has the facts but struggles to be heard or believed internationally, highlighting the need for smarter external messaging.
The US views Lai with growing suspicion: the strong influence of his deep-green pro-independence base, his use of separatist rhetoric to secure votes and his volatile temperament make him unpredictable and hard to control.
Washington will strive to restrain Lai through pressure from the American Institute in Taiwan, regular arms sales and its trusted “proxy”, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. Yet Lai’s tendency towards provocative pro-independence moves will remain.
The interaction between two highly unpredictable actors could see Trump push the "Taiwan card" to its limits, while Lai leverages America to counter China, driving a prolonged cycle of high-risk escalation.
However, the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is tilting increasingly in Beijing’s favour. Since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit, China’s large-scale military drills have effectively secured the PLA’s maritime and air dominance around Taiwan.
Zhong: “When you connect all four exercises together, a clear pattern begins to emerge. It outlines a comprehensive, seamless, three-dimensional encirclement strategy with no blind spots.”
Beijing’s triadic approach of ”responding to (应对)”, “managing (管控)” and “leveraging (利用)” crises will help turn such situations into momentum for cross-Strait reunification.
“Responding” entails “meeting soldiers with generals and meeting water with earth” — in other words, taking whatever measures are called for when challenges arise.
“Managing” focuses on ensuring that crises do not spiral out of control.
“Leveraging” — the most important of the three — involves exploiting crises to achieve strategic gains.
Zhong: “Anyone who studies the Taiwan issue knows that it is a small island lacking sufficient natural resources and heavily reliant on imports … What is needed now is the right opportunity—if the United States produces such an opportune moment, the overall dynamics could shift fundamentally.”
The Author
Name: Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛)
Date of birth: May 1983 (age: 42)
Position: Associate Professor, University of International Relations (UIR) (2022–Present); Deputy Director, Strategic Communication Research Centre, UIR; Deputy Director, Department of Culture and Communication, School of National Security, UIR
Formerly: Researcher, Institute of Taiwan Studies, CASS (2011–2022)
Research focus: Cross-Strait Relations; Taiwan’s domestic politics; Cross-cultural communication
Education: BA-MA Capital Normal University (2001-2007), PhD Peking University (2007-2011)
Experience Abroad (visiting scholar): University of Oregon; Johns Hopkins University
First published and posted