a reprint from
BEIJING ADVISER YAN ANLIN ON WHY A TIMETABLE FOR TAIWAN REUNIFICATION HAS DISADVANTAGES
Yan Anlin (严安林)
Originally, interviewed by Amber Wang of the South China Morning Post (21 April 2025).
Many thanks to the SCMP for allowing Sinification to reproduce this interview.
PREAMBLE
"It is likely to take another 5 to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift."
Yan Anlin (严安林) ranks among China’s foremost Taiwan experts. As he likes to note himself, he was the first person in mainland China to earn a Ph.D. in Taiwan studies, has been regularly consulted by Beijing for policy advice and served as a close aide to Wang Daohan (汪道涵)—Beijing’s representative during the landmark 1993 cross-Strait talks.
Yan is also highly adept at addressing both domestic and international audiences. Given his background and connections, it is hard to imagine his granting any “tell-all” interview on Taiwan that would stray from messaging closely aligned with the PRC’s interests. His latest paper—Research on Discourse Construction and Practical Strategies for International Communication Concerning Taiwan-related Issues, published last December—demonstrates as much.
Far from making Yan’s insights worthless, this is simply a reminder that much—though by no means all—of what he says in public is probably subject to careful calibration. One could argue the same of most mainland-based international-relations scholars, particularly those who work in think tanks with close government ties, yet few subjects are as politically sensitive and tightly managed as Taiwan.
With this in mind, Yan’s interview with Amber Wang of the South China Morning Post seems crafted to deliver two main messages: to the international community, a further reassurance that Beijing is unlikely to move militarily against Taiwan in the near term; to the Taiwanese, a renewed warning that Beijing’s patience is waning and that the window for voluntary negotiations is closing rapidly. Both points are encapsulated in his comment that “the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency” and in his headline-grabbing statement that “full reunification” is “likely to take another five to ten years to achieve”. If shared at home, the same remarks would similarly help temper public expectations while reaffirming Beijing’s unwavering resolve.
One point that merits caution is the notion that Beijing lacks a deadline for (re)unification. Leading Taiwan specialists on both sides of the Strait have long highlighted the link Beijing draws between its goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049 and completing (re)unification with Taiwan. As Xi Jinping told the 19th Party Congress in 2017, "Achieving complete national reunification is an inevitable requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (实现祖国完全统一，是实现中华民族伟大复兴的必然要求)”. By anchoring the two goals together (as his predecessors also did), Xi leaves the future Party leadership little room to keep postponing the issue.
April 28 2025
Key Points
Cross-Strait (re)unification is likely to occur within the next five to ten years through peaceful means.
Despite a growing sense of urgency, Beijing is unlikely to have set a definitive timeline for this objective.
Although some in China may argue that publishing a timetable would provide clearer strategic direction, others emphasise the risks involved in committing to a hard deadline.
Disagreement also persists over which political framework should govern Taiwan—a decision that may depend on whether (re)unification is achieved peacefully or by force. Beijing’s blueprint for the island therefore remains a work in progress.
The determining factor for cross-Strait (re)unification continues to be the extent to which China’s hard and soft power can continue to grow.
6. Trump's position on Taiwan remains uncertain, but two things are relatively clear: he is averse to war and unlikely to “abandon” Taiwan.
7. So far, Washington’s support of Taiwan has been “low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing”.
8. Although the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait has been increasing since Tsai and now Lai came to power, Beijing is confident that the forces opposed to Taipei declaring independence—including the US—far outweigh those supporting it. Moreover, China now has the means to prevent such a scenario.
The Scholar
