"I believe that from [Lai's] seventeen points, it should be clear to us that the reunification of the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed. Decisive action must be taken."
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NO ONE CAN STOP US FROM ENTERING OUR OWN TERRITORY — TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA
Gao Zhikai (高志凯)
Published by Guancha.cn on 2 April 2025
Translated by Paddy Stephens
Jun 02, 2025
Among China’s establishment intellectuals engaging with Western media, few defend Beijing more pugnaciously than Gao Zhikai (高志凯), better known internationally as Victor Gao.
A Yale Law School graduate, later admitted to the New York Bar, Gao worked at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s, acting as an interpreter for Deng Xiaoping. Since then, he has held senior positions across investment banking, regulatory bodies and corporate management. Gao now serves as vice-president of the Beijing-based think tank Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG).
What distinguishes Gao from many of his scholarly peers is his readiness to debate and confront China's critics abroad in unvarnished, even provocative English. He not only deploys his assured diction, quick retorts and courtroom style to reinforce official talking-points, but often pushes them into more hawkish, headline-grabbing territory—such as when he warned Australians that acquiring nuclear submarines could turn their country into a nuclear target; or when he suggested that, following reunification with Taiwan, residents of Japanese ancestry should be made to sign pledges of loyalty or face expulsion. Much like China’s “wolf-warrior diplomats” of recent years, Gao puts the slogan “daring to struggle” (敢于斗争) into practice with notable fluency.
His recent interview on cross-Strait relations with Guancha is similarly combative and deserves no less attention than more cautious arguments put forward by scholars who emphasise strategic patience, deepening socio-economic integration across the Strait and achieving reunification through peaceful means. Gao, by contrast, calls for a sharp escalation in Beijing’s coercive pressure: expanding grey-zone tactics and intensifying efforts to document any Taiwanese involved in “anti-PRC” behaviour. He argues that President Lai Ching-te has already crossed Beijing's red line and insists that “decisive action must be taken” sooner rather than later—confident that the United States would not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, should Beijing move to take the island by force.
The publication of hawkish views such as Gao’s suggests that Beijing endorses them, or at the very least condones them, as it sees strategic value in their dissemination—both at home and abroad. The same cannot be said of perspectives that challenge core tenets of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. For instance, scholars who strongly oppose reunification through armed force tend to do so implicitly, as will be evident in a yet-to-be-published article by Shen Zhihua (沈志华), a leading Chinese historian of the Cold War.
Key Points
Lai’s seventeen security strategies targeting China, along with his designation of the mainland as a “hostile foreign force”, have “fundamentally altered the cross-Strait status quo”.
• Gao: “I believe that from these seventeen points, it should be clear to us that the reunification of the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed. Decisive action must be taken.”
• Gao: “We must seize the opportunity to strike hard while they are on the back foot. Now that Lai Ching-te has revealed his true colours, we must crush his every move, leaving these Taiwanese separatists no more room [to stir up further trouble].”
Lai’s recent measures targeting mainlanders living in Taiwan are intended to intimidate, suppress pro-China sentiment and discourage cross-Strait interaction further.
They also aim to coerce alignment with his pro-independence agenda and to promote the narrative that Taiwan and the mainland are fundamentally separate national entities. This is all “extremely dangerous”.
Beijing should establish a system to track and score individuals in Taiwan based on their stance towards reunification, enabling future rewards and punishments according to documented behaviour.
Beijing should also send unarmed civilian vessels, uncrewed boats and drones ever closer to Taiwan’s soil—forever disregarding the median line, establishing a new normal and framing PRC actions as peaceful and non-military in nature.
• Gao: “[However,] if you dare to fire upon them, you will bear the consequences — we won’t fire the first shot, but that does not mean we won’t fire the second.”Reunification requires strategic ingenuity beyond a simple choice between negotiation or military force. A coup like the 1936 Xi’an Incident by a key figure within Taiwan could offer such an opening.
Beijing should make clear that the “One Country, Two Systems” framework is an offer of goodwill; if Taiwan rejects it, only “One Country, One System” remains, and preferential policies will no longer apply.
The PRC should integrate economic and demographic data from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau into national statistics to challenge the perception of Taiwan as a separate entity.
• Gao: “Internationally, the term Greater China [大中华地区] is often used […] I believe the time has come for us to put forward openly and confidently [our own] concept of a One-China Region [大中国地区].”It should also require annual written reaffirmations of the One-China principle from countries who engage diplomatically with China. Noncompliance must carry consequences, and Taiwan’s increased participation in international organisations must be blocked.
Trump’s aim is “to bleed Taiwan dry and seize its wealth”, not to protect it. If Beijing pursues reunification through military means, the United States will not come to Taiwan’s defence.
The Author
