PREAMBLE
Basing on the comments from Guancha.cn which illuminated certain elements of how the visit by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Beijing and Shanghai has been perceived and framed in China.
Blinken’s visit to China could be regarded as being positive insofar it helped strengthen the consensus already reached by Xi and Biden during their San Francisco summit in November, 2023. However, on hindsight, the US could not accomplish much during the run-up to November’s US presidential election.
Secondly, Washington is still strengthening its anti-China alliances in its attempt to contain the PRC, and Beijing is definitely not inclined to assist such an insincere behavioural posture.
With such a negative view of China and maintaining and treating the civilisation state as an adversary, US-China ties will continur to remain particularly fragile.
Thirdly, indeed, no positive improvement in relations is to be expected any time soon.
Nevertheless, efforts from both sides over the past year have at least yielded three positive outcomes: official interactions and communication have been strengthened, full decoupling has been abandoned and people-to-people exchanges have been facilitated.
INTERVIEW WITH WU XINBO: HOW DID BLINKEN'S VISIT TO CHINA GO? WAS IT A WORTHWHILE TRIP?
Wu Xinbo (吴心伯)
Source: Interview by Guancha.cn published on 26 April 2024
[ Machine translated ]
Journalist: From April 24th to 26th, Antony Blinken embarked on a three-day visit to China. During his stay here, he held meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Overall, how do you think Blinken's visit to China went? Was the trip worthwhile for him?
Wu Xinbo: I think this mainly depends on how it is evaluated. If we look at it from the perspective of advancing the implementation of the "San Francisco Vision" previously agreed upon by the leaders of the two countries [in November 2023], this visit has achieved some positive results. The five-point consensus just reached by both sides is basically a continuation of the consensus established by the leaders of China and the United States in San Francisco. However, if we look at it from the perspective of the US’s pre-visit wishlist, Blinken did not achieve his expected goals. This also reflects the different approaches of China and the United States in handling bilateral relations. China is still trying to promote the improvement of relations based on the consensus reached between President Biden and Xi during the San Francisco summit. However, the US’s expectations for this visit indicate that the US wants to reset the agenda of US-China relations. The five-point consensus reached by both sides shows that the US’s attempt did not succeed.
Journalist: President Xi mentioned during his meeting with Blinken that "the first button" must be fastened before China-US relations can truly stabilise, improve and move forward. What do you think is the key to fastening the "first button"? In which areas do both sides need to make efforts?
Wu Xinbo: Fastening the "first button" mainly means having a correct understanding of one another. China insists on mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation. However, the United States still regards China as its primary strategic competitor and most serious geopolitical challenge, believing that China has the greatest willingness and capability to challenge the existing international order. If the United States sees China from this perspective and considers China as an opponent or even an enemy, then the bilateral relationship will certainly be difficult to manage. The key issue lies in whether the US regards China as a partner, an opponent or an enemy. The US is finding it difficult to break out of its cognitive block towards China. The "first button" can therefore not be fastened, resulting in problems in the US’s policy towards China and difficulties in the management of US-China relations. Therefore, I believe that the US must have the courage to identify and correct its misconceptions about China.
Journalist: This is Blinken's second visit to China within a year. It comes ten months since his last visit in June last year and about six months before the US’s presidential election later this year. Why did Biden choose to send officials like Yellen and Blinken to visit China at this particular point in time?
Wu Xinbo: In November 2023, the leaders of China and the United States reached a consensus during the San Francisco summit which aimed to maintain high-level exchanges and increase communication. The recent visits to China by Yellen and Blinken are part of these high-level exchanges. The US has been relatively proactive. The main reason for this is that this is an election year during which the Biden administration needs to advance certain interests that are related to its policy towards China. These include both domestic and diplomatic aspects. As the saying goes, people won’t get up early unless there are some benefits to be gained in doing so. Yellen's focus during her last visit to China was on economic issues, especially the so-called "Chinese overcapacity problem". This is mainly due to the rapid expansion of China in the "new three" markets [i.e. electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries and solar cells], which has caused unease in the United States because this is an important area where the United States currently lags behind China. Blinken had a relatively long list of key issues [to discuss] during his visit, which included the Russia-Ukraine [war], the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, fentanyl and other issues. The US wanted to address these issues with China and express its concerns, and hoped that China would cooperate.
Journalist: On the eve of Blinken's visit to the PRC, both China and the United States provided an advance briefing about their respective goals and demands for this visit. The practice of providing such briefings in advance seems to be fairly uncommon for China. What is your interpretation of this and of what was being emphasised by both sides?
Wu Xinbo: For the US, this practice is very common. Before the American president or senior officials visit other countries, the US often announces with great fanfare the demands they will make. This practice is partly aimed at briefing its domestic audience and partly at putting pressure on the other party. This is, in a sense, seeking a psychological advantage at the negotiating table, which is a common trick used in US diplomacy. For China, in the past, when the two sides were preparing to meet, we would generally create a positive and polite atmosphere by saying some positive things. I believe that China's approach this time was prompted by the US’s own behaviour and was aimed at countering both the US's attempt to dominate the rhetoric around the US-China relationship and Washington’s unilateral pressure on China. Therefore, China clarified its position on some key issues during its advance briefing and, over the past two days, has expressed dissatisfaction with the US's remarks on overcapacity, its policy towards Taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues. This indeed differs from China's previous diplomatic style. When dealing with the United States, I believe we need to be conversant with America’s diplomatic style and tactics and respond in a targeted manner. When comparing the contents of China and the US’s advance briefings, we can discern their different stances and interests. Washington expressed its current domestic and foreign interests and concerns at the same time as putting pressure on China. China, on the other hand, believes that it is necessary to adhere to the consensus reached by the US and China during the San Francisco summit, establish a correct understanding of the other side, strengthen dialogue, manage differences effectively, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and jointly assume responsibilities as major countries. The interaction between China and the United States should not only serve the US’s short-term interests. Blinken's visit should be placed within the larger framework of US-China relations.
Journalist: Before Blinken's visit to China last June, the United States, Japan and the Philippines held their first trilateral meeting between national security advisors. Similarly. before his visit to China this year, the three countries held their first trilateral summit. Both of these gatherings covered topics relating to the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. What kind of signal is being conveyed by such arrangements?
Wu Xinbo: The Biden administration's policy towards China can be summarised in three words: "investment, alliance and competition". This involves: first, investing domestically to strengthen the United States; second, roping in allies in order to contain China; and third, engaging in bilateral competition with China. The US, Japan, and the Philippines fall under the second part of the US’s policy towards China, which is to strengthen partnerships, form small groups and gang up against China. This is not a new tactic. Through these strategic moves, the Biden administration may have been hoping to enhance the US’s position in its rivalry with China and gain some form of an advantage [that could be used] during Blinken's visit to China. But from China's perspective, these actions actually indicate that the United States lacks sincerity with regards to improving its relations with China. Although the US says that it does not seek to contain China or draw allies in to oppose China, its actions indicate the opposite. The US’s China policy lacks sincerity and credibility. It says one thing and does another. These actions did not score any points in the run up to Blinken's trip to China. They had the exact opposite effect, shrouding his visit in a rather negative atmosphere. Washington’s actions make it very hard for China to believe in its sincerity, thereby making it difficult for Beijing to respond positively to and act on issues of US concern.
Journalist: Blinken's first stop on his visit to China was Shanghai, where he held a meeting with Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, visited NYU Shanghai and the American Chamber of Commerce there, had a look around Yu Garden and the Bund, and watched a basketball game. What is your assessment of his itinerary in Shanghai?
Wu Xinbo: Apart from meeting with Secretary Chen Jining, most of Blinken's activities in Shanghai were not official. I believe the main purpose of his itinerary in Shanghai was to increase his understanding of China. During his last visit to China, he only went to Beijing. However, China is vast and understanding it requires more than just visiting Beijing. As one of China's main economic centres, Shanghai is an important bridge connecting China and the United States, so visiting Shanghai was also an important way for him to get a sense of China. Visiting the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai was aimed both at understanding the concerns of American companies in China and at hearing their calls in favour of promoting Sino-US economic ties. Visiting NYU Shanghai was more to show support for cultural and educational exchanges between China and the United States, which was a relatively positive gesture. During Yellen's last visit to China, she is said to have attracted a lot of attention on Chinese social media when she dined out. Therefore, Blinken also wanted to engage in some down-to-earth activities, so he visited Yu Garden, the Bund, and even watched a basketball game. This shows a subtle change in his diplomatic approach to China.
Journalist: Since Blinken's visit to China ten months ago, what do you see as having changed and not changed in US-China relations and the US’s policy towards China?
Wu Xinbo: The changes are reflected in three aspects: First, over the past year, there have been relatively close communication and exchanges between China and the United States. The US’s desire for high-level exchanges and more communication is quite obvious. Although there have been reciprocal visits, overall, there have been more US officials visiting China than Chinese officials visiting the US. Second, in terms of policy-related discussions within the United States, there is now a relatively clear understanding with regards to economic issues that it is impossible for the US to completely decouple from China and that decoupling does not align with US interests. What the US can do is to "de-risk". In fact, "de-risking" itself is a form of "decoupling", albeit a partial one. If the boundaries of "de-risking" are not controlled properly, it may lead to more "decoupling". However, both Yellen and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo mentioned during their respective visits to China that the US is not seeking to decouple from China and hopes to promote, to some extent, the development of Sino-US economic ties. Third, there have been some constructive developments in the social and cultural exchanges between the US and China, such as the increase in direct passenger flights between China and the US and the optimisation of visa application processes. Although these are in the low-political realm, I believe they are helpful for improving the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations. What has not changed is quite obvious and is also reflected in three aspects: First, the basic understanding or positioning of the United States towards China has not changed. In other words, it still regards China as its primary competitor and its most serious geopolitical challenge. Second, the basic framework of US policy towards China remains unchanged and primarily focused on the containment and suppression [of our country]. Third, Washington’s efforts to rally allies and form cliques to oppose China remain unchanged. So, on the one hand, we see visits to China by US officials like Yellen and Blinken, but on the other, the US continues to intervene in issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea and continues its technological suppression of China.
Journalist: What kind of state do you see the US-China relationship being in at the moment? How is it set to develop? What are the key points or important events to pay attention to?
Wu Xinbo: US-China relations are currently in a stable yet relatively fragile state. Compared with a year ago, the relationship is more stable. But this stability is fragile and uncertain because the United States continues to advance its policy of containment and suppression of China. In future, I believe that the development of US-China relations will continue to be full of twists and turns and that it won't be possible for this relationship to really stabilise or improve in any significant manner. Especially in this 2024 election year, the Biden administration needs to be tough on China and will exert pressure on us to address its own interest-related concerns. Under these circumstances, the room for improvement and development of US-China relations will be very limited. The real election campaign in the United States will start after August. Currently, it is still in the stage where both parties are nominating their candidates. After the national conventions of both parties in July and August, their candidates will formally "start the fight". Biden and Trump have not yet gone head-to-head. After the summer, as the election becomes tenser, I believe both parties will increasingly play the "China card". In doing so, the negative spillover effects of domestic US politics on US-China relations will grow. In fact, Biden has already started. For example, he has announced tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminium, mainly to gain votes from the United Steelworkers and workers in the steel industry. In addition, he is considering imposing tariffs on China's new energy vehicles and photovoltaic goods. These actions by Biden are geared towards specific voters and have a domestic political purpose. In the months ahead, there may be more such actions showing toughness towards China and putting pressure on us in order to manipulate voters during the election. If Biden feels that his campaign is not going well, he may well play the China card even more. Therefore, I believe US-China relations can maintain a fragile and shaky stability in the first half of this year, but with more turbulences coming in the second half of the year.
The Author
Name: Wu Xinbo (吴心伯)
Year of birth: 1966 (age: 57/58)
Position: Director of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University (Wu has been working there since 1992).
Other: Advisory role in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Research focus: China's foreign and security policies; US-China relations; International relations in the Asia-Pacific
Education: BA-PhD Fudan University (1986-1992)
Reposted from
Sinification
(C) Thomas des Garets Geddes
London, United Kingdom
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