A reposting from
May 27 2025
Editor’s Note:
Renowned Chinese geopolitical expert Zheng Yongnian explores how China should position itself within the China–U.S.–Russia trilateral dynamic, steer clear of involvement in either Russia’s or the U.S.’s expansionist ambitions, and best advance its own interests.
Zheng Yongnian:
In today’s rapidly evolving international landscape, what concerns the Chinese public most is the recent surge of interactions and communications between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin over ending the Ukraine war. This concern is far from groundless. Although China is not a direct party to the war, the way it ends will inevitably shape the future global order. Put differently, U.S.–Russia engagement will not only impact China–U.S. relations, but will also have profound implications for the future of the “China–U.S.–Russia strategic triangle.”
Recently, Trump has once again made his thinking on China–U.S.–Russia relations publicly known. On March 19, 2025, during an interview with Fox News, he expressed caution about the growing closeness between China and Russia and outlined his plan to improve relations with these two countries, which he referred to as “the so-called anti-American alliance on the world stage.” Not long after a phone call with Russian President Putin, Trump stated, “As a student of history, which I am — and I’ve watched it all — the first thing you learn is you don’t want Russia and China to get together. ” He cast doubt on the foundation of the current friendly ties between China and Russia, suggesting that their relationship is not “natural.” He added, “They’re probably friendly now, but we’re going to be friendly with both. ”
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in a February 2025 interview, responded to the increasingly popular view in the U.S. and the broader Western world known as the “reverse Nixon” approach. He remarked, “I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful completely at peeling them [Russia] off of a relationship with the Chinese. I also don’t think having China and Russia at each other’s neck is good for global stability because they’re both nuclear powers, but I do think we’re in a situation now where the Russians have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese, and that’s not a good outcome either if you think about it .”
Whether during his first term, throughout his re-election campaign, or now in his second term, Trump has made numerous statements on the dynamics among China, the U.S., and Russia—and those statements have shown a high degree of consistency. At the very least, this consistency suggests that Trump has his own ideas about trilateral relations, and is not simply acting on others’ advice. In fact, this applies to his thinking on many other issues as well. The only difference is that his ideas are often so unconventional that they are neither understood nor accepted by the American elite or most Western policymakers—let alone by people in other parts of the world.
Is Trump Playing the Role of a “Reverse Nixon”?
Around the world, perhaps the most closely watched issue in the trilateral relationship among China, the U.S., and Russia is whether Donald Trump is now playing the role of a “reverse Nixon.” If the original “Nixon” strategy refers to Washington’s Cold War maneuver of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split—specifically the Nixon administration’s efforts to “ally with China to contain the Soviet Union”—then the so-called “reverse Nixon” refers to a potential Trump strategy of embracing Vladimir Putin’s position on issues such as Ukraine in order to split Russia away from China, ultimately achieving the goal of “aligning with Russia to contain China.”
Whether this idea of a “reverse Nixon” comes directly from Trump himself remains unknown. But it is certainly a concept that has been circulating widely among the American policy elite. When Trump first entered office in 2017, U.S. media reported extensively that Henry Kissinger had advised Trump to pivot toward Russia as part of a broader strategy to “ally with Russia against China.” Since then, many voices in Washington have emerged advocating a “reverse Kissinger” strategy, urging the United States to realign itself with Moscow to counter Beijing.
In practice, during Trump’s first term, Washington officially designated China as its primary strategic competitor. Under President Biden, this positioning became even more explicit, with China being described as the only country with both the capability and intent to compete with the U.S. on a global scale. The Biden administration built up a network of what Chinese analysts often call “mini-lateral blocs” in the Indo-Pacific and beyond—small coalitions aimed at containing and countering China.
Now that Trump is back, he seems uninterested in maintaining America’s traditional alliance system—and is even attempting to disengage from it. The Biden administration had spent four years rebuilding alliances worldwide to confront both Russia and China under the banner of “democracy vs. autocracy.”
Trump, by contrast, shows no interest in ideology. He appears to be pursuing rapprochement with Russia—even at the cost of sacrificing Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “betraying” democratic allies. All of this is in service of reconfiguring America’s foreign policy priorities.
But does this really constitute a “reverse Nixon” strategy? According to Trump’s own recent statements, his goal is actually to “get along with both China and Russia.” In a March 19, 2025 op-ed, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman cautioned readers to “not believe a word he says” when it comes to Trump. While Friedman’s skepticism is not without merit, a closer examination suggests that the logic of a “reverse Nixon” and Trump’s personal strategic instincts may, in fact, diverge significantly.
China Must Stand Firm On Its Own Stance
Naturally, it remains uncertain whether Trump has the ability to alter U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations, whether he can reshape the strategic triangle among China, the United States, and Russia, or what kind of triangular relationship he ultimately intends to create. Nonetheless, as the world’s second-largest economy, China must formulate its own independent thinking, strategic approach, and goals. In this triangular relationship, China should not allow itself to be led by other major powers—whether the United States or Russia—but should instead shape the dynamics according to its own national interests.
The current situation, however, is not optimistic. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Chinese online public opinion has been deeply divided. Some support Russia, hoping China will openly side with Moscow in opposition to the U.S.-led West. Others favor the West, wishing China would publicly break with Russia and align with the United States. Similar divisions can be seen in the reaction to Trump’s approach of seeking rapprochement with Russia at the expense of Ukraine. Those sympathetic to Russia welcome Trump’s behavior as a positive development for Moscow. In contrast, those previously leaning toward the United States are angered by what they view as Trump’s betrayal and express sympathy for Ukraine, celebrating Europe’s firmer stance in support of Kyiv.
Although Chinese netizens’ reactions to Trump are not unique compared to those in other countries, the Chinese—coming from a nation that was repeatedly bullied, invaded, and partitioned under unequal treaties imposed by imperial powers—should neither idolize Trump’s power politics nor advocate for Zelensky to submit to humiliation. Such views represent a betrayal of China’s own historical experience. The phrase “a weak nation has no diplomacy” is a succinct summary of China’s modern history.
When witnessing Trump publicly scolding Zelensky, the first image that should come to mind is not geopolitical gain, but Chinese diplomat Li Hongzhang being forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in Japan after China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. In essence, what is the difference between Zelensky’s current humiliation and Li’s experience? Aside from the difference in era, the underlying logic is strikingly similar.
In shaping the China-U.S.-Russia triangle and the future global order, China—as a major civilization—must establish its own position. It should not see itself as an extension of the United States, nor as a replica of Russia. Without a clear civilizational stance, China will find it difficult to achieve genuine prominence and influence on the international stage.
Western “Expansionism” and the Collapse of the “Liberal Order”: Why Is China Different?
The decline of both Russia and the Western liberal international order is an inevitable consequence of expansionism. The seeds of Russia’s decline were sown during the Soviet era of expansionism. After World War II, both the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union and NATO led by the United States embarked on expansionist paths—one representing socialist imperialism, the other capitalist imperialism. The Soviet Union’s overreach ultimately led not only to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact but also to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, giving rise to today’s Russia. From any perspective, contemporary Russia is no longer comparable to the former Soviet Union.
Similarly, the disintegration of the liberal international order centered on the United States can also be traced back to expansionism. The root of the problem lies in the word “liberal,” not in “international order.” The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, and the West mistakenly assumed this signaled the final and total victory of liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis became widely influential, asserting that liberal democracy was the best and final form of human governance. At the time, liberal ideology in the West reached an unprecedented high point. Russia under Boris Yeltsin hoped to be integrated into the Western system; both the EU and NATO were seen as ideal platforms for Russia’s stability and security. Vladimir Putin, in his early years, held similar aspirations. In pursuit of becoming a part of the West, Russia, the United States, and Europe did make some efforts.
Unfortunately, Russia was rejected and excluded by the West. This outcome reflected a fundamental truth: one form of expansionism cannot tolerate another. The logic is simple—the United States cannot accept challengers from outside, let alone from within. If Russia were to become a full member of the Western system, would it not then be in a position to challenge U.S. dominance from within?
The U.S.-led West not only refused to accept Russia but also initiated a rapid expansion of NATO, pushing it deep into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence—its “backyard.” From this perspective, the war in Ukraine is a natural reaction from Russia, a nation known for its martial spirit. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Russia from a massive empire to a state widely seen in the West as “second-tier” or even “third-tier,” Russia remains a major nuclear power. It could not avoid seeking adequate strategic space. In this context, whether framed as a counterattack or a renewed expansion, Russia’s actions toward its former republics were rooted in the pursuit of national security.
China’s situation, however, is fundamentally different. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rising “liberal international order” directed its attention toward China. The decision by the U.S.-led West to allow China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), still dominated by Western countries at the time, had clear strategic motives. The goal was to transform China— to shape it into a country more like the Western world, one that the United States could easily influence or even manipulate.
To read the full article, please visit What's China's Take on the New U.S.-Russia