PREAMBLE
"The effectiveness of Modi's diplomacy shows a stark contrast between the regional and global arenas: while [India] shines brightly on the global stage, its regional influence has declined markedly."
That was as assessed by Thomas des Garets DES Geddes and Manoj Kewalramani
JUN 27th posting in
A brief overall perspective by Manoj Kewalramani is presented herein:
Historically, the relationship between the modern Indian and Chinese states has been characterised by strands of cooperation, competition and even conflict. These continue to co-exist, although increasingly both countries seem to be viewing each other through the threat rather than opportunity prism. This has meant that contestation and volatility have become the defining characteristics of the relationship. In this regard, I concur with Hu’s assessment (a future posting by Hu Shisheng [胡 仕胜], Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations) - that ties are likely to be characterised by “cold hostility.” Despite the outcomes of the recent elections in India, this situation is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, owing to the following structural factors.
First, both India and China are rising powers and major economies. Over the past three decades, both have witnessed simultaneous expansion in their respective interests and capabilities to pursue those interests. This has engendered greater friction between the two sides. Unfortunately, Hu characterises this situation as India “pushing the boundaries” on China-related issues. This belies an appreciation of India’s genuine interests in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, for example.
Second, while both countries have experienced a simultaneous rise, the pace of this growth has been sharply uneven, favouring China. Consequently, structurally, there now exists a deep power asymmetry between the two countries. It is worth highlighting that with enhanced capability and acknowledging the asymmetry, Beijing appears to have grown less risk-averse when it comes to deploying force. In response, India appears to have not only sought to invest in its expanding economic development and defence capabilities but has also pivoted towards greater external balancing, with partners like the US, France, Australia and Japan. Chinese analytical writing on the issue has rarely been introspective of the implications of Beijing’s actions on India’s choices. An article by Hu also fails to engage in this.
Third, the shifting balance of power between the United States and China and the changing nature of their bilateral engagement are impinging on Sino-Indian ties. One key aspect of this is Beijing’s myopic and US-centric worldview. Often, Chinese discourse and analyses tend to discount the agency of actors like India, viewing them primarily from the perspective of the China-US strategic competition.
Hu - in a World Affairs (世界知识), June 2024 - does seem to view the India-US relationship as deeply transactional and not without friction, acknowledging India’s desire to maintain its strategic autonomy.
Manoj is the chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Research Programme at the Takshashila Institution and a non-resident senior associate at CSIS.
He is the author of Smokeless War: China’s Quest for Geopolitical Dominance and the editor of the excellent Tracking People’s Daily - a must-read newsletter for all China watchers.