Author: Yang Na (杨娜) – Deputy Director of the Centre for European Studies, Nankai University
Background: Academic. Focus: Europe and global governance. PhD Nankai University (2010).
Published: February 2023
Source: People's Tribune
“The future development of the EU's strategic autonomy may be constrained by the lack of power of its key member states, the instability in its neighbourhood and the restrictions imposed by the US’s establishment of a Western technological alliance. However, its specific attributes and resilience determine that the EU remains an important global actor and will continue to play a key role in global governance and world affairs.”
Summary:
EU strategic autonomy (prospects):
Pessimism:
Power disparity: The EU’s global power is waning and has been since the 2008 financial crisis. The growing disparity in economic, military and technological power with the US is threatening to further increase the EU's dependence on Washington.
Internal divisions: The split between CEE countries on the one hand and Germany and France on the other has widened on a number of foreign-policy-related issues.
Security and defence: The war in Ukraine has increased the EU’s dependence on the US/NATO. Short-term prospects remain particularly unpromising. France alone will not be able to push the EU’s defence autonomy forward. Germany fears antagonising the US, while other member states prefer to rely on NATO or may not want to cede more sovereignty to Brussels.
Science and technology: The EU-US Trade and Technology Council and other US-led tech alliances across the world are not only severely constraining the EU’s technological autonomy but also forcing it to side with the US in its tech war with China.
“Optimism”:
Transatlantic fissures: Distrust of Washington remains.
The EU’s quest for strategic autonomy continues:
Quote 1: “In its external relations, and despite the aforementioned challenges to its pursuit of strategic autonomy, the EU possesses exceptional integrative powers and adaptability. It [now] combines normative soft power with hard power and, without undermining its special relationship with the United States, is developing a global strategy distinct from that of the United States, based on its own interests and viewpoints. It is continuing to act as a leader in specific areas of global governance, as a “balancer” [平衡者] in the context of great power relations and as a stabiliser of regional events.”
Quote 2: “In the current international context, the EU is trying hard to step out of the confines of strategic competition between the major powers and to avoid, as far as possible, making either/or choices [非此即彼的抉择]. However, on certain important or topical issues, being tied to the US has meant being forced to face the dilemma over which side to choose. Policies towards China are [now] the focus of transatlantic relations. [However,] the EU is committed to developing a policy towards China that is different from that of the United States, from the standpoint of safeguarding its overall security and economic interests.”
Author: Yan Shaohua (严少华) – Junior research associate at the Centre for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University.
Background: Academic. Focus: EU/EU-China relations. PhD University of Hong Kong (2017).
Published: February 2023
Source: 1. Lead article in Fudan’s yearly “Report on European policies towards China”; 2. “EU policies towards major countries and regions”
“As the Ukrainian crisis continues and deepens, the Russian factor may overtake the US as the most important external factor influencing the EU's policy towards China … Looking ahead to 2023, the EU's China policy is expected to maintain the re-stabilising dynamic seen at the end of 2022. Re-engagement based on new foundations could become a realistic consideration for the EU's policy towards China. Thus, a new window of opportunity for China-EU relations could emerge in 2023, but engagement itself does not mean that China-EU relations will return to the 'business as usual' state of the past.”
Summary:
1. Impact of the war in Ukraine on EU-China relations:
The EU has misinterpreted China’s stance as "pro-Russia neutrality" and now views Beijing as being closer to Russia than it used to. As a result:
Brussels has put greater emphasis on the “competitor” and “rival” components of its triadic “partner-competitor-rival” approach to China.
The EU has tilted further towards Washington in the context of US-China rivalry.
The “Russian factor” has become the key to shaping China-EU relations (俄罗斯因素成为左右中欧关系的关键).
Economically, the war has:
Increased Europe’s need to both stabilise and develop economic relations with Beijing.
Exacerbated European worries about economic over-dependence on China.
Sino-Russian cooperation has increased the perceived security threat that China may pose to Europe and Taiwan.
The influence of China-sceptic and pro-US Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in EU decision-making has risen.
The EU’s dependence on the US has deepened; transatlantic coordination on a wide range of issues (incl. China) has increased; and EU strategic autonomy has been stifled (战略自主性受到压制).
EU-China – Prospects for 2023:
Economic difficulties in Europe are expected to encourage closer economic cooperation with China but the EU’s shoring up of its supply chains will continue.
The EU’s re-engagement with China over the last few months of 2022 is expected to be maintained with the upcoming visits of other European leaders to Beijing. A “new window of opportunity” for China-EU relations could yet emerge but “business as usual” is no longer to be expected.
Ideological differences, US pressure, the war in Ukraine, the Swedish presidency of the EU and human rights concerns are just some of the issues that may yet constrain the scope of such political engagement.
In the run-up to the 2024 US presidential elections and European parliamentary elections, transatlantic ties and cooperation could well deepen even further but disagreements on a number of issues (e.g. Inflation Reduction Act and LNG prices) remain latent and may yet resurface.
Author: Long Jing (龙静) – Deputy director of the Centre for European Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)
Background: Researcher. Focus: EU/EU-China relations. PhD East China Normal University (2008).
Published: February 2023
Source: 1. Edited transcript of a speech; 2. Article in Fudan’s yearly “EU policies towards major countries and regions”.
“Should the EU's expectations of Chinese mediation in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict be dashed, its desire for faster access to the Chinese market for European goods and services (including vaccines) fail to be met, and the trade deficit problem not be alleviated, the EU's China policy will probably harden once again.”
Summary:
1. EU-China relations in 2022:
On the surface, engagement with the EU has been increasing but in reality the EU and its member states have become “even more entrenched in their misunderstanding of and prejudice against China”. This includes:
Seeing China as being part of the autocratic camp [专制阵营].
Seeing China as using the war in Ukraine to its own advantage [渔翁得利者].
Such “misconceptions” have led the EU’s policy towards China to be increasingly geared towards “protection, exclusion and containment” [防华、排华、遏华]:
Protection: NATO labelling China as a "systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security"
Exclusion: Partial decoupling and shoring up of supply chains.
Containment: Strengthening ties with Taiwan, Japan and countries in the Indo-Pacific.
The influence of China-sceptic countries in central, eastern and northern Europe on the EU’s China policy has increased at the expense of France and Germany’s.
Conflicting views on China among EU institutions, politicians and member states are complicating EU-China relations.
Stabilising economic relations with China has become a priority for a weakened EU.
2. Prospects for 2023:
EU-China relations will be marked by uncertainty.
The EU and the US will continue to coordinate their policies towards China despite economic frictions. However, the EU will not completely side with the US and will continue to seek to distinguish its policies from those being formulated in Washington.
The impact of “values” on EU-China ties will continue to increase. This could lead to renewed tensions and to the indefinite shelving of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI).
The EU’s desire to cooperate with China will decline. While the need for cooperation in many areas will remain, more emphasis will be placed on economic competition and systemic rivalry with Beijing.
(N.B. There is greater emphasis on the EU’s desire to engage with China in Long’s piece for Fudan than there is in the edited transcript.