Early today, it's reported that Recep Tayyip Erdogan - who often vexed Western allies while tightening grip on power during 20 years as Turkey’s paramount politician - has won re-election on Sunday, 28th. May 2023.
Erdogan is able to overcome contentious competition from a newly unified political opposition, and widespread voters’ anger over mounting cost of living, to secure another five-year Presidential term because of AKP membership density base:
An early commentary on the Erdoğanisation of Turkey’s politics is HERE.
Meanwhile, in another part of the world, there were the Thai elections ostentiously with an united democratic force confronting seemingly an unmovable political, but militarised, entity.
As situations evolved, the liberal Move Forward party stormed to a commanding lead with around 152 seats in the lower house, with Pheu Thai placing a creditable second on 141. The leading government party Palarang Pracharat was smashed, winning only 41 seats, while the United Thai Nation Party claimed a mere 36.
The Australian National University's eastasia forum editorial board opinated:
The Thai old guard is unlikely to make way quietly for a party that has pledged to undo much of its power. They have, roughly speaking, two possible methods for keeping Move Forward’s Pita Limjaroenrat from becoming Prime Minister: the constitutional and the extra-constitutional. The former is for the moment more likely…..
Ahead, there are ‘multiple dangers abound for Pita and Move Forward, threatening his chance at the Prime Minister’s chair.’
‘[i]f Pita is unable to garner sufficient support to become prime minister, the prime ministership could fall into the hands of Pheu Thai, and Thai media has speculated that a Pheu Thai government may be willing to drop Move Forward from its coalition to garner support from the senate.’
Moreover, the Election Commission, which is under the thumb of the current government, could try to wreak havoc through its ability to annul results if it determines that electoral rules were broken. Despite the undeniable mandate that a Move Forward–Pheu Thai coalition would have to rule, it is still quite possible that the conservatives will find a way under the army-drafted constitution to keep at least Move Forward out of a future government.
If the coalition manages to peel away enough senators to elect Pita, however, the army and its allies will be faced with a much more serious dilemma. Will it, for the fourteenth time in a century, use its muscle to overthrow the government?
Any military intervention would have potentially explosive effects for Thai society and damaging consequences for its economy. It would also present major dilemmas for ASEAN, which would rather stick to its long-standing principle of non-interference in the affairs of member states but has set a precedent about the limits of political backsliding it is willing to tolerate among its members. It downgraded Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN meetings after the ouster of the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government via military coup in 2021.
A similar coup in Thailand is the last thing ASEAN needs now as it seeks to shore up its relevance internationally — a message which should be, and hopefully is, being quietly but clearly made to Thailand’s military through diplomatic channels.
Jacob Ricks of SMU explains in a lead article, that ‘multiple dangers abound for Pita and Move Forward, threatening his chance at the Prime Minister’s chair where, indeed, that though the Thai election’s done and dusted the political uncertainty remains.’
In fact, on any qualified assessment, the most important element of democracy is the willingness of consent from the loser. One has to say that this consent is founded on the implicit belief that neither government nor opposition is a permanent state of affairs for any major party.
From an Asia-Pacific rim perceptive, successful transitions from military to workable civilian rule in Asia have often taken place when the incumbents felt they could remain competitive in free and fair elections — a belief that made it safe for ruling cliques, for examples, in South Korea and Taiwan to concede democratic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. In the archipelago of Indonesia, too, the successful transition to democracy after the fall of Soeharto - who served as the second and the longest serving president of Indonesia - in 1998 was partially secured by the realisation among the leaders of his former party, Golkar, that they stood a good chance of maintaining some power through the ballot box.
On the other hand, Thailand socio-political situation seems an anomaly. On one dimension, the conservative elites encased within a traditional feudal legacy, that question remains an existential reflection. To most observers, no matter how hard they try, the militarised civilian governance is a brand the Thai people seem resolutely uninterested, and retaining an apathetic attitude, in buying. In every election since 2001, voters have rejected them. While the military has denied that there is any chance of another coup, that was exactly what Prayuth has had said prior to the coup in 2014 too.
Related Readings
Jacob Rick, Though the Thai election’s done and dusted the political uncertainty remains
Paul Chambers, Thais vote amid the spectre of a post-election coup
