With China's brokering of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Sino-Iranian interplay in relationship has come a long way. After seven years of stalemate and proxy wars, Iran and Saudi Arabia had agreed on 10th March 2023 to begin normalizing their relations through a China mediation effort. This important development comes at the conclusion of intensive secret talks between the countries in Beijing, following more mediation efforts by Iraq and Oman, too.
One needs to say that Sino-Iranian relations are transactional, asymmetrical, and often constrained by divergent interests and priorities. Iran's isolation - and her morbid economy - has ensued a risky diplomatic venture for Beijing. On the other hand, Iranian critics had not infrequently viewed China as self-serving and opportunistic.
Although stability and cooperation are integral to China's Middle East strategy, Iran is usually portraited as a revisionist actor that promotes regional dissonance and instability.
These intrinsic tensions, however, do not detract from an important but less noticeable dimension of Sino-Iranian relations. Indeed, by deliberately cultivating an air of ambiguity around their cooperation and its future prospects, both countries have been exploiting their bilateral ties as leverage with third parties.
According to Sun Degang and Liu Zhongmin, China has created a new model for great power diplomacy in the Middle East. This would well promote a peace and dialogue model between Israel and the Palestinians, too.
Sun Degang - who rector of Fudan University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies - told The Paper that promoting the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is only the first step in a long march.
“It will be a significant milestone for China to mediate the improvement of relations between the two countries, as well as to drive the improvement of relations between Iran and the entire Gulf and Arab countries.........
........Because both sides realized that such conflicts did not make them safer, they were compelled to sit down and talk, thereby creating internal conditions for reconciliation.”
Sun Degang further reiterated that...In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the great power competition and proxy war in the Middle East between the US-led West and Russia has weakened, adding external conditions for reconciliation, (excerpt from The Paper, March 11, 2023).
Liu Zhongmin, directorof Shanghai International Studies University’s (SISU) Middle East Studies Institute, added that the intense competition between the two has resulted in the emergence of a "strategic overdraft problem" 战略透支问题, with neither side is able to shape Middle East affairs according to its own will.
“At the same time,” Liu said, “both sides are under domestic development pressure. In 2016, Saudi Arabia unveiled its ‘Vision 2030’ to accelerate its development transition [from fossil fuels]”.
In his speech at the Arab League headquarters [during his 2016 visit to Egypt], General Secretary Xi Jinping has clearly stated the Three No's Principle 三不原则, namely [China would] "not pursue the use of proxies, but rather promote peace and negotiations"; [it would] "not engage in building spheres of influence, but rather promote countries to join the Belt and Road Initiative's circle of friends"; and [it would] "not seek to fill a vacuum, but rather weave a network of mutually beneficial partnerships."
According to Wang Jinglie, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of West Asian and African Studies, explained at the time that China’s Three No's Principle has set the norms of China's diplomacy in the Middle East and its foreign relations, establishing a new paradigm for great power diplomacy.
The successful Saudi-Iranian dialogue in Beijing, according to Ding Long, a professor at SISU's Middle East Studies Institute, is a victory for peace, demonstrating China's commitment to promoting security and cooperation in the Middle East through its Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Ding Long explains the significant development in the Saudi-Iranian dialogue in Beijing in a Global Times article (in Chinese) published on 11th, March, 2023:
“First, head-of-state diplomacy 元首外交 is paving the way. President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022 to attend the "Three Summits" between China and Saudi Arabia, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and China and the Arab League.
“Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi paid a state visit to China last month at President Xi's invitation. Indeed, China has provided Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for Middle East security through concrete actions.
“China has worked hard to promote security in the Middle East since 2014 when President Xi first proposed a new concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. The fact that Saudi and Iranian delegations came to Beijing for talks demonstrates China's sincerity and a vote of confidence [in its abilities].
“Second, it serves as an effective illustration of the GSI in action. The fact that archrivals such as Saudi Arabia and Iran were able to beat their swords into plowshares 铸剑为犁 thanks to China's mediation fully demonstrates the GSI's lofty vision, which can serve as a compass and a roadmap for calming conflicts and resolving contradictions [worldwide].
“China has been working for peace in the Middle East for several years, not only between Iran and Saudi Arabia but also between many other parties in the region. For example, it proposed the Gulf Security Framework and initiatives to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It has done so on several occasions without seeking personal gain.
“The fact that Saudi Arabia and Iran finally achieved a fruitful outcome 修成正果 [lit. "achieve Buddhahood"] demonstrates that China's peace and security ideas are highly practical and operational.
“Third, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation is in line with current trends. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been embroiled in protracted conflicts and suffered massive losses in recent years. Under internal and external pressure, both countries have since realized that development is the first priority and that only development can promote peace.
In furtherance to this dynamic international affairs development, Professor Ma Xiaolin, director of Zhejiang University's Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR), has this to say on China's effective mediation that has been welcomed by the international community and the US and that it could serve as a model for Beijing diplomacy in other hotspots, too.
Excerpts from Ma’s article first published in the China Daily on 11th. March 2023:
“What astonished people around the world was that the Middle East has traditionally been dominated by the US or Russia, not China. It was the US that would facilitate or back Middle East peace initiatives, such as the 1978 Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel brokered by President Jimmy Carter and the 1993 Oslo Accords between Palestine and Israel brokered by President Bill Clinton.
“This occasion could serve as a model for Beijing's effective mediation of significant regional crises and lead to the emergence of a "Beijing Consensus" 北京模式 [lit. “Beijing Model”].
“Equally significant is the Saudi-Iranian commitment to "activate" 激活 the 2001 security cooperation agreement, as well as the 1998 bilateral general agreement on cooperation, which covers a wide range of fields including economy, trade, investment, technology, science, culture, sports, and youth. The conclusion of the tripartite joint statement means that the abrupt deterioration of Saudi-Iranian relations since 2016, which resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations and all ties, will be a thing of the past.
“Furthermore, with the full restoration of Saudi-Iranian relations, the Saudis and Egyptians, among others, are likely to remove two radical nationalist forces opposed to Israel, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, from the "terrorist organization" blacklist.
“The Saudis had long funded Hamas and accepted Riyadh's good offices in several conflicts with Israel, but as Saudi-Iranian relations deteriorated, Riyadh saw Hamas as a traitor.
“Hezbollah, which is funded by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has been a thorn in Saudi Arabia's side since its inception in 1982. Riyadh is keen on backing rival Sunni forces while limiting Iranian influence, and it resents the fact that Hezbollah constantly provokes Israel and causes wars, creating a moral dilemma 道义困境 for its own moderate Middle East policy.
“In addition to serving as the organizer of the secret meetings, Wang Yi actively mediated Saudi and Iranian relations and actively promoted dialogue and cooperation in the Gulf. Back in March 2021, when he was still foreign minister, Wang Yi visited six Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, and promoted the signing of the 25-year Strategic Cooperation Plan between China and Iran.
“In January 2022, Wang organized a "Middle East Week" of Chinese diplomacy in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, where he met with six Middle Eastern foreign ministers, including Saudi Arabia and Iran.
“Both waves of positive events emphasized China's importance in Middle Eastern affairs, boosting Middle Eastern countries' strategic trust in China and, to some extent, lubricating the easing of Saudi-Iranian relations.
“The international community generally welcomes the return of goodwill between the two Middle Eastern powers, given that both are major energy producers and exporters, which is beneficial to the Middle East and global energy market stability.
“The US government is also pleased with the outcome and has expressed support. Since the Obama administration, it hoped that Saudi Arabia and Iran would put aside their identity politics and focus on regional counter-terrorism efforts.
“Additionally, they believe that Iran can now be a part of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Especially now that America's strategic focus has clearly shifted to Eurasia to deal with Russia and China, this would prevent Israel from using force and dragging it back into the Middle East quagmire.”
(China Daily)
CONCLUSION
A few observations are that this emerging geostrategic venture does highlight the diverse strategical postures by Riyadh. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is undertaking bold positions vis-a-vis the United States. For instance, on critical issues like opening up more to Russia and China despite knowing quite well the potential ramifications and consequences of its actions.
Masoud Mostajabi - associate director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council - on the other hand has this to say that this geostrategic diplomacy development underscores China’s growing presence in the region and poses a challenge to the United States who may well attempt to undermine these efforts.
Seen from Paris, this event represents a real success for Chinese diplomacy. On one hand, this is clearly a foray of China as a powerbroker in a region which used to be a preserve of the United States and, sometimes, its allies. On the other hand, China is displaying a skill in mediation which is also with no real precedents, as expressed by Michel Duclos who is a senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a former French ambassador to Syria.
In short, this Chinese “diplomatic coup” could well be the beginning of a deeper political engagement of Beijing in the Gulf region. Secondly, this initial successful China's mediation effort would likely become a template for an attentive Chinese diplomacy not only in the Middle East but on other spheres.
RELATED READINGS:
Sun Degang with Zhang Dandan, Diplomacy of Quasi-alliances in the Middle East, Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2020.
[Quasi-alliance refers to the ideation, mechanism and behavior of policy-makers to carry out security cooperation through informal political and security arrangements. As a "gray zone" between alliance and neutrality, quasi-alliance is a hidden national security statecraft. Policy-makers tend to seek a third way to strengthen security cooperation and meanwhile avert the risk of conflict]
Sun Degang, et. al., China’s Participation in the Middle Eastern Security Affairs (in Chinese).