To those who have underestimated the strengths and tenacity of the Western civilization in maintaining the post-war order, here's a reflective piece on building a community with a shared future where a civilisation state shall lead a new and fresh development model for emerging countries.
Ding Gang 丁刚, senior editor of People's Daily and senior researcher of Chongyang Institute recently stated that 2023 is a critical year for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, displaying a 'game between change and invariance' in major power relations, above all in how the US and the West view China's rise and modernisation.
2023 will be a critical year for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, allowing us insight into both changes and invariance in the global pattern. An all-round, objective and accurate grasp of relations between change and invariance will play an important role in how China can properly handle global affairs, handle relations between major powers, and deal with crises in the future. It’s crucial to make use of and create an international environment that is conducive to our own development. I share two points of view:
First, the great changes unprecedented in a century. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown us what is changing, what has not changed and what is difficult to change. This game between change and invariance is primary, determining the game of great powers and how the US and the entire West view the current international order, its relations and rules. It of course also affects how they view China's rise, not least when as now we propose Chinese-style modernisation. These all determine how they view this modernisation, and indicate the future direction and intensity of the game between the group rise of new economies and traditional developed countries.
Whether it is from the US suppressing PRC manufacturing globally, curbing exports of high-end chips to it, forming factions, controlling the US’s dominant position in the political and economic situation, NATO’s continued eastward expansion, or Russia’s efforts to retake it through war. In terms of its sphere of influence, we can see that the basic elements of the old IR system still play important roles. These are difficult to change in the short term, but there is a strengthening trend.
I asked some scholars as regards the Russia-Ukraine war: would the Russians have decided to go to war had they predicted, prior to it, that winning Ukraine within a year would be impossible, that it would definitely take one, two, three years or even longer?
I thought it made sense to ask this now: quite a few experts argue that Russia may not have gone to war. Even had it still wanted to fight, it needed at least to prepare better before doing so.
A related question is whether the current state of the conflict has exceeded the expectations of many people, including many experts.
Let's think about it, maybe this situation was not only an overestimation of Russia, but an underestimate of the US and Europe, above all of the West as a whole. They underestimated the West’s political, economic, military, financial and many other strengths, and their tenacious will to ensure the post-war order and maintain Western civilisation’s dominance in the global order. The conflict cannot be easily read as a sign of European weakness; Europeans, represented by the EU, have realised that Russia's challenge is one that really touches the order that Europe gained through two world wars. The EU and NATO's support for Ukraine can hence be grasped as defending Western civilisation and the modern order established on its basis.
The entire old security order and security pattern have not, we see as well, undergone fundamental changes. Europe’s Cold War is over, yet it remains divided. The security crisis, due to geopolitics and divided spheres of influence, has yet to reach an end. In Asia, the 38th parallel still exists, China has not yet been unified, and demarcation of the South and East China Seas is incomplete. These issues remain dormant for the time being. More to the point, to solve these problems today we still have to go back to the previous system, which remains US-dominated, created post-War, and divided by spheres of influence. Is critically remains in the strategic grasp of the US. Given the situation remaining tense, states involved will be ever more dependent on the US and the West. Emerging now, this state of play is a serious issue, harming Sino-Japanese, and Sino-ROK mutual trust.
A similar primary change prompted by the war is that it further bolsters internal solidarity of the US with the EU, and the EU with NATO. Germany no longer imports oil from Russia, Europe is trying to survive a winter of reduced crude oil imports from Russia, Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO, and Central and Eastern Europe have strengthened military defences against Russia. Has Europe backed off? Not so far. The policy towards Russia has received broad public support. It seems that NATO will keep reinforcing its armaments against Russia and expanding eastward. States that have not yet joined may do so in succession. Eastern European states had some conflicts with old Europe, yet will still strengthen support for Ukraine and armaments against Russia. The EU will stick to its policy of sanctioning Russia; this is ever more likely to be long-term. Even if Ukraine makes concessions or reaches an armistice agreement with Russia to some extent, the EU's strategic exclusion and separation of Russia will be long-term, short of changes in Russia that Europe is hoping for.
Worth noting by China: the conflict has changed Europeans' view of China and will profoundly impact their future policies towards it.
There's no denying changes in the overall international pattern, of course. There was a postwar wave of anti-colonialism and independence around the world. With the end of the Cold War, globalisation was promoted, expanded and stepped up by the emerging economies as they rose. The world economy in fact underwent immense change, evenly divided between emerging and developed states. Yet we should be aware that these rises remained within the framework of the postwar order; that change in the post-war system made the rise of these countries possible, forcing the original IR system to adjust. But this was not subversion. Emerging economies mainly sought to improve their voice and participation in decision-making.
Indeed, the rise of emerging economies leveraged the post-war international system. While promoting system adjustment and forming a certain degree of multi-polarisation, developments like China's accession to the WTO actually consolidated the IR system, we saw Eastern European states continue to join the EU, and so on. They were in fact conducive to the stability and continuation of the postwar international system. Nor have post-Cold War changes, e.g. regionalisation and grouping in economics and trade, including BRICS, RCEP, etc., fundamentally changed the basic framework or fundamentals of the pre-existing global system. In principle, there may be some new adjustments and changes, yet basic things remain unchanged, and it is still difficult to say that this is a new start.
The world is after all in a stage of change and invariance. This may take a long time, or a stage of fierce competition between these two forces The primary thing is that this stage will not be short-term. Relatively weak in force terms, the West has failed to disintegrate. At the same time, because they are aware of this crisis, they have strengthened their coordination and unity, consolidating and strengthening the pre-existing system above all; they will pay more attention to ideological difference, to the spread of ideas, and to their internal adjustments and changes, including economic transformation, restructuring of industry and supply chains, etc.
As to whether the existing system should be changed, it certainly must be, and no one can stop it. The issue is how to change or reform it, and China's role in it, which really determines China/West and China/world relations. I think this run-in must also be long-term: ‘change’ as a trend tests the PRC’s role as a major power in future changes, its more active participation in changes in the global order, and its more responsible role as a leader in global development. We cannot say that China's future role is to rebuild a brand new international system. This is the second point I want to talk about.
The game between change and invariance is long-term, and unpredictable uncertainties are many. This involves whether a Chinese-style modernisation, above all a new path of peaceful development, can be achieved in the world in terms of ideology, theory and practice.
For a think tank shouldering important responsibilities, theory building is at this time I think primary.
On the basis of an all-round grasp of today's changes and changes, it is vital to correctly grasp the relations between China's rise and the existing global system and order, above all its relations with the US and the West. We cannot simply attack the ‘China threat theory’ created on purpose by the US, that ‘China is a destroyer of international order and rules’. There must be criticism, but it must above all be broken and established. When we criticise the West, we can’t just call them wrong: we need to explain in light of reality why they are wrong. We need to combine theoretical grasp of the West, the ideological system of modernisation, peaceful development and building a community of shared future, and create relevant theory.
One problem we have now is following Western agenda setting. Many of our thinktanks are like this, not just the media. Whatever topics they raise, we react to and refute. What may may matter in future is that we have to start a new topic, re-establish our own topic, and form a situation of ‘you cite yours, I cite mine’. We can't always let the likes of Voice of America lead our conversation. Nor can we always write international op-eds like the press. I myself have been engaged in international op-eds, but I think the work done by thinktanks should be more about building theory, rather than just writing op-eds rebutting the West.
We saw NDCY do a lot of work in these areas last year, the primary purpose of which was to gain a clearer grasp of current global structures and changes in strength. Field research on Russia has for example mastered a lot of first-hand materials , Thinking while walking, and Walking while thinking, this is what think tanks need most, and it is also the basic prerequisite for our own agenda setting.
A thinktank’s primary role is to provide more solid policy support and theoretical basis for the PRC’s peaceful development by combining its practice of going global since reform and opening and the changes in existing IR. Only thus may we fundamentally shake the West's attempt to portray China as a destroyer of international rules and order, breaking through the siege of hostile Western public opinion.
PRC development since reform and opening proves we neither seek to overthrow the current global system, nor develop in the existing system: we seek to reform and adjust the existing system making more conducive to countries like ours. Emerging economic systems, development of developing countries. We are completing our own path selection in running-in with the pre-existing system. Western countries has never in the past five centuries seen a development path, above all of peaceful development, like ours. It will fundamentally change the Western perception of national development.
We must hence keep talking about our peaceful development, systematically, through various forms, and on various occasions, especially for more developing countries. Our rise is that of a development model different from the Western monolinear mode. China can rise peacefully, as can more of the others. Other developing countries may be unable to fully copy our model, but the path choices it has made will definitely indicate the direction of the future development of human society. We are not here to fight the West, but to fight for space, create space, and shape public opinion for China's peaceful development within the existing order.
We attach importance to building doctrine, narrating China's peaceful development based on our development practice, and create our theoretical system. We must above all study building a community with a shared future in light of the current changing situation, offering targeted suggestions on basic principles. This can merge with the practice of the BRI, challenges to current Asia-Pacific and East Asian security systems, and our practical experience in resolving border disputes with neighbours. Combining our mechanism building of the BRICS and the SCO, and accumulating experience from the process of peace, negotiation, and management and control of differences, we can form some basic principles and determine some basic concrete and operable ways to deal with hot issues. It lays a good practical foundation for future doctrine building. These are vital research directions for PRC thinktanks.
This is, we should see, a long-term ideological and conceptual game with Western views of civilisation and history, an arduous struggle of public opinion, and of course a process of shaping our national image.
As delivered at the Global Governance Research Center of China-US Humanities Exchange Research Center of Renmin University of China, and Jufeng Financial Research Institute - hosted by China Renmin Univerity’s Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, 16-17 January 2023.