PREAMBLE
According to Chinese statistics, by the end of March 2023, China’s accumulated direct investment in the five Central Asian countries exceeded $15 billion, while the accumulated volume of engineering and construction contracts amounted to $63.9 billion. China has became the main source of capital investment for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, providing more than 40% of total foreign direct investment in the latter two.
Central Asia is of significance to China’s energy security and its connection to European and Middle Eastern markets. The region is crucial for promoting China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia. The Central Asian countries feature prominently at all four levels of contemporary Chinese diplomacy: (1) “periphery/neighborhood diplomacy” (周边外交) due to their geographical proximity; (2)“developing countries’ diplomacy” (发展中国家外交) due to their developing status; (3) “multilateral diplomacy” (多边外交) due to their membership alongside China in multilateral mechanisms; and (4) “great power diplomacy” (大国外交) because of great power rivalry in Central Asia. Beijing conceptualized the basis for building relations with the region in 2022, when Xi Jinping called on the Central Asian countries to “build a community of common destiny for China and Central Asia.”
Beijing has had often fears of the effect upon its western regions of nearby socio-political instability, cross-border and inter-ethnic conflicts, and the spread of extremism from Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is especially vulnerable to the “three forces of evil” (terrorism, extremism, and separatism).
Viewing Central Asia as Russia’s “strategic backyard” and also as a “common neighborhood”(共同的周边) of China and Russia, Beijing has painstakingly avoided challenging Russia’s special status in the region and maintained harmonious relations with Moscow. The SCO, founded in 2001, opened wide opportunities for Chinese interaction with Central Asia in cooperation with Russia. In addition to the SCO as the basic multilateral mechanism for coordinated operation in the region, Russia and China have also jointly taken other important initiatives, such as the May 2015 agreement to link the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) with the EAEU, and the 2018 agreement on China-EAEU trade and economic cooperation.
The FULL TEXT is from the Russia in Global Affairs - accessible HERE.
AN ABSTRACT
After the start of Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine in February 2022, some in the West thought that China might take advantage of Moscow’s diverted attention in order to elbow Russia out of Central Asia. Around the same time, China, having overcome the COVID-19 pandemic and lifted restrictions on cross-border cargo transportation and movement of people, enhanced its economic and diplomatic activity in Central Asia. This situation raises a set of interrelated questions. What is behind China’s drastically increased activity in Central Asia? What are the driving forces of Chinese policy in the region? How does Beijing see its opportunities and challenges in Central Asia amid ongoing changes there and the overall new geopolitical situation? Does Beijing intend to undermine Russia’s position in the region? The author offers an analysis of what Chinese experts say and write on this score, providing some clues to the matter.
AUTHOR
YANA V. LEKSYUTINA
Doctor of Political Science
Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia
School of International Relations
American Studies Department
Professor
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