PREAMBLE
Beijing shall strive to strengthen its ties with ASEAN countries because China’s geopolitical security and future economic development depend on this positioning. Further, the importance of Southeast Asia’s neutrality - as adequately explored by Kishore Mahbubani - lies in the context of the US’s rivalry with China.
Regardless whether the November 2024 re-election of Joe Biden (or another Democrat) with its U.S. hegemonic globalised world view or Donald Trump as a quasi-fascist who risks leading the world into a strategic of denial instability - the dynamic environment will not prevent the West from gradually decoupling from China, nor the world fractionalised into two separate blocs.
We in Southeast Asia should believe that ASEAN is the most valuable diplomatic area for China to rely on so as to temper the advance of extremism by reducing the risk of war in the Asia-Pacific basin.
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CHINA'S PERIPHERY DIPLOMACY
Zheng Yongnian (郑永年)
Published by South China University of Technology’s Institute of Public Policy (IPP) on 30 June 2024
edited lightly by machine-translation as reposted from
1. Introduction
Today, I would like to explore the broader context of China-ASEAN relations and China's periphery diplomacy [中国的周边外交], which includes [our relations] with Japan and South Korea, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Russia, the Middle East, South Asia and so on. After all, in today's world, it is increasingly difficult for China to separate its diplomacy in one region from another.
I remember Napoleon once said, "China is a sleeping lion of the East. When she wakes, she will shake the world." After China "fell asleep", its entire modern history became a history of humiliation—defeated in the two Opium Wars, then defeated by its "former student" Japan and after more than a century of war and revolution from 1840 to 1949, the Chinese people finally stood up.
Since its reform and opening-up period, China has achieved a [remarkable] rise after awakening. Now we must realise that China has become one of the focal points in global geopolitics. The next question to consider is: when “asleep”, we were bullied; now that we have awakened and risen, how are others [attempting] to encircle, contain or even throttle us [扼杀]?"
From this perspective, China-ASEAN relations are particularly important.
The current relationship between China and ASEAN [countries] is strongly impacted by the broader international context. In this regard, I think it can be viewed from three levels.
2. The Rise of Populism and Nationalism
First, at the micro level, populist and nationalist forces are rising across the world. The domestic and foreign affairs of sovereign states are inseparable. As the Prussian military strategist [Carl von] Clausewitz once said, diplomacy is the continuation of domestic politics and war is another manifestation of politics.
What are the domestic politics of countries like in today’s world? As evidenced by the recent European Parliament elections, whether it is in the US, Europe, or even Latin America, whether in the West, East, North or South, and regardless of the [country or region’s] level of development and political system, the whole world is facing a rise in populism and nationalism.
Although this pertains to the domestic level, international relations scholars must never forget the lessons that have repeatedly emerged throughout history.
Nationalism and populism are two sides of the same coin. Once the forces of populism and nationalism are unleashed, they will have a long-term impact on the international political landscape. Populism and nationalism are linked to the development of one’s domestic economy and society. It takes a long time to resolve and stabilise such a political situation.
We can take a look back at how, before World War I and World War II, populism led to the two world wars. We can also look back further at the rise of the socialist movement in Europe after the 1848 revolutions.
It should be noted that the populism mentioned here is not just a right-wing stance; positions taken by the left-wing [can] also manifest themselves as populism. Clashes between right-wing and left-wing extremism within [individual] countries can easily show up in international politics.
3. No One Likes War, but War Eventually Happens
Second, at the national meso level, populist forces have begun to compete for power. From the recent EU parliamentary elections, one can see that the rise of extremism and the far-right is an inevitable trend. If Trump comes to power again, it is highly likely that the US will form a "quasi-fascist regime" [准法西斯主义政权]—Trump mentioned in one of his speeches that he intends to "lock up" his political enemies and those he "dislikes". Such statements are manifestations of populist and fascist sentiments.
For China, if political forces like those of [Mike] Pompeo and [Steve] Bannon, who are extremely hostile to China and the Communist Party of China, come to power, the United States will probably adopt a 'fascist' foreign policy towards China [对华实行“法西斯主义”的外交政策]. In particular, a Trump administration would have an impact on European politics, leading to the emergence of more 'quasi-fascist' regimes in Europe, similar to the rise of fascist regimes in many European countries before World War II.
Of course, if Biden can remain in power, it will have a certain restraining effect on extremist groups. However, we must also be clear-eyed that his China policy will see no significant softening.
Mr. [Henry] Kissinger once said: "No one likes war, but war eventually happens."
Everyone wants to solve domestic and international problems using other means, but when they can't, they resort to violence. The logic behind international wars and domestic violence is the same: domestically, when many issues cannot be resolved, [we] resort to violence; internationally, weaker nations will resort to violence to resist stronger nations. Similarly, if major powers cannot resolve problems with smaller countries or with other major powers, they too will resort to violence.
4. One World, Two Systems
Third, at the macro level, the bipolarisation of geopolitics has become a major trend. This bipolarisation [两极化] is evident not only in the economic realm but also in the political and geopolitical realms. Politically, Biden refers to Sino-US competition as "American democracy vs Chinese ideology”.
Economically, the international trade system centred around the WTO has stopped working and has been supplanted by various US-led trade groupings.
We have said all along that the United States is engaging in “deglobalisation”, but in reality, it is actually in the process of reconstructing international trade organisations around itself. Recently, the West has been promoting another narrative, namely that China is creating a China-centred international trading system by means of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Is the global trading system really [becoming] akin to a world split into two separate systems [一个世界，两个体系], as some people say? Although this remains an open question, the speed of decoupling between China on the one side and the US and Europe on the other, is accelerating. We must be careful.
Geopolitically, the United States has put significant effort into reshaping its geopolitical [strategy], establishing a number of exclusive alliance networks in China’s neighbourhood. This is another manifestation of this “one world, two systems”.
From the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” to AUKUS, the US is trying to “de-risk” its supply chains, artificial intelligence, information and military technology away from China.
Micro-, meso- and macro-level forces are reinforcing each other, accelerating the reshaping of the current world order.
5. The West’s Cognitive Warfare Against China
In this context, the relationship between China and ASEAN [countries] has profound significance. Recent trends indicate that ASEAN countries' perception of China has improved considerably when compared with their view of the United States. This is essentially the result of the interplay of the [above] three factors.
In the same way, these three levels are also influencing the relationship between China and ASEAN [in a negative way]. In particular, the recently concluded Shangri-La Dialogue has many new and noteworthy aspects compared with previous years:
According to relevant reports, at the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue, US allies such as the Philippines, Australia and Canada hyped the China threat narrative on issues such as those relating to the South China Sea and "freedom of navigation".
First, both the US and Europe are shifting their strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region. The US has been shifting its strategic focus to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region since the Obama era. In recent years, it has been restructuring the geopolitics and economic framework of the Indo-Pacific region in order to achieve this strategic goal.
Surprisingly, Europe's geopolitical focus has also shifted to the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions. The Shangri-La Dialogue, initially a forum for Asia-Pacific security, has now almost become a platform for transatlantic security concerns.
From Biden's recent media interviews, it can be seen that the US has a very clear understanding of the progress of the Russia-Ukraine war, including the daily number of shells used and the number of soldiers lost. Why hasn't Russia failed as quickly as the West predicted?
The US and Europe are now waging a cognitive war, effectively “bundling” China and Russia together. Although this 'bundling' has existed since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West is now starting to attribute its failure to defeat Russia to China.
Senior US officials have been shaping the narrative that "it is because China exports dual-use goods to Russia that the Russo-Ukrainian war can continue." Despite the US and Europe themselves trading energy and other commodities with Russia, China is seen as the most important support for Russia in its war of attrition.
We cannot underestimate this cognitive warfare. In Europe, whether in the media, diplomatic circles or strategic circles, all complaints and hatred are being vented on China in the belief that China is the root cause of Russia's ability to fight a protracted war. This not only affects China's relationship with the West but also impacts its relations with ASEAN [countries].
I believe that, from any angle, ASEAN is the most valuable diplomatic area for China [to focus on] for a long time to come.
6. Japan and South Korea: No Hope in Sight
Let's look at Northeast Asia. Japan and South Korea have already become completely passive [躺平; lit. “laid flat”] because their national security systems form a part of the US’s own security system. They have already decided to continue following the US diplomatically.
7. China-Russia Ties: On the Qui Vive
We currently have a good relationship with Russia. However, both countries have their respective strategic considerations. We must pay close attention to the state of the conflict in Ukraine and monitor any changes in Russian policies. If Russia adjusts its stance and China has not adjusted its own in time, we will find ourselves in a very passive position [如果俄罗斯自己调整了，中国还没来得及调整，那么我们将陷入非常被动的局面。].
I noticed that on the day the West commemorated the Normandy landing, Putin held several hours of meetings. From the wording, it seems that Putin hopes to adjust the course of this war.
In any case, Russia remains a part of the West [不管怎么样，俄罗斯还是西方的一部分]—ever since the Tsarist era, Russia's only goal has been to become a 'Western country'.
In fact, the relationship between Russia and the West is not as antagonistic as we perceive it to be. When the West rejects Russia, Russia opposes the West; when the West accepts it, Russia couldn't be happier. From the Soviet Union's Gorbachev to Russia's Yeltsin and to the early years of President Putin, they have all been very pro-Western.
According to Russia’s Sputnik News Agency, President Putin has stated that Russia is willing to continue negotiations with Ukraine on condition that the current state of the battlefield is preserved.
We must pay close attention to the adjustment of Russia's attitude towards the West in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Particularly, once the United States has identified China as its only competitor, the US will reconsider [its stance] towards Russia. For the United States and other Western countries, the goal of their diplomacy towards Russia will be to ensure that Russia no longer causes trouble.
In the end, once Putin has achieved some of his goals and the West has achieved some of theirs, they will probably be able [to start] compromising. If we do not clearly understand this and continue with our previous policies, we will find ourselves in a very passive position.
8. China and Central Asia: Security First
In our relations with Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) plays an important role. However, interactions between China and these countries within the SCO is more focused on security. Although consideration for economic [issues] is present, it takes a backseat. Throughout China’s millennia-long history, it has been difficult to achieve a major shift towards development in our diplomatic policy towards our northwestern periphery. We must also note that Turkey’s rise will put a lot of pressure on our northwestern frontier.
9. The India Problem
If we now look towards South Asia, India has huge ambitions [野心勃勃]. We must pay close attention to the development of China-India relations. In the modern era, the nation-state known as “India” did not come into being through its own efforts; it was bestowed by the British. At the founding of India, the parties led by Gandhi, Nehru and others were family-based parties. Now, Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has developed from a regional party into a national party. We must not underestimate him [我们绝不要小看他].
Ideologically, the Indian nationalism espoused by Modi is a combination of "Hindu nationalism" and "anti-China nationalism" [反华民族主义]. Since "Hindu nationalism" poses significant risks domestically, Modi frequently resorts to "anti-China nationalism" to strengthen his governing legitimacy.
Modi is still strengthening his Hindu nationalist agenda, which, while attracting a large number of voters, also sows the seeds of potential religious conflict.
At the same time, the situation in India also reflects that the transformation of political parties in late-developing countries is often centred on the nation-state. I believe the pressure that India exerts on China does not stem from its role in the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, but rather from India's own systemic transformation and subsequent rise. With China and India as two major neighbouring countries, China remains defensive [中国还是防御性的] and finds it difficult to expand diplomatically within India's sphere [of influence].
10. On the Importance of China-ASEAN Relations
Therefore, ASEAN is extremely important to China. For China to become a maritime power, it cannot afford to lose ASEAN; for China to continue advancing [its] economic development and modernisation, it cannot afford to lose ASEAN; and for China to ensure [its] geopolitical security, it cannot afford to lose ASEAN either.
Overall, our policy towards ASEAN in recent years has been relatively successful. When Pompeo visited Southeast Asia, he tried to rally Southeast Asian countries to follow the United States. However, ASEAN made a collective decision not to take sides between China and the US. On one hand, ASEAN has maintained its security relationship with the US, while on the other, it has developed its economic ties with China. This is very beneficial for China.
China itself has adopted the right diplomatic policy towards ASEAN. When the US was forcing ASEAN to choose sides, China adopted [and advocated] “open” and “inclusive” multilateralism, thereby providing a premise for ASEAN countries to maintain their neutrality.
Looking at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue, what kind of pressure will ASEAN face once the United States and Europe shift their strategic focus from India to Southeast Asia?
How should we view China-ASEAN relations from ASEAN's perspective?
How should the South China Sea issue be resolved? [Should we] continue with [our] previous approach, or should [we] adopt a different way of thinking?
Regarding our economic ties with ASEAN, is the 3.0 version of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area mechanism [really] sufficient?
I believe that political, economic and social aspects all need to be considered. Recently, we have been looking into the construction of a China-ASEAN common market and found that, in the context of [our] current trade wars with the United States and Europe, the 3.0 version of the China-ASEAN FTA mechanism is still insufficient to unleash the full vitality of China-ASEAN bilateral economic relations.
What should [our] research community do? I believe that our research on ASEAN is far from sufficient. Area studies have now become a first-level discipline [in China], but the focus of area studies needs to go beyond language. It is difficult to study ASEAN merely through languages. We should focus more on studying ASEAN through the lens of social sciences.
Another factor [in our relationship] with ASEAN is the Chinese diaspora. The vast majority of overseas Chinese reside in ASEAN countries. However, they can constitute both a bridge for our diplomatic outreach and a pitfall leading to diplomatic mistakes.
The relationship between the Chinese diaspora and their motherland is very complex and cannot be explained in a few words. It should be considered from a more intricate perspective. We should not assume that just because there are Chinese people in Southeast Asia, diplomacy can be advanced just as we envision it.
I hope that our new generation of researchers will approach the study China and Southeast Asia from the perspective of global politics. Simply looking at China-ASEAN relations solely from the viewpoint of China-ASEAN relations no longer allows us to understand the essence of the problem.
In order to understand the economic and political realities of Southeast Asia better, we need to view the relationship between China and ASEAN from all aspects such as global geopolitics, the reshaping of the world’s economic system and ideological competition. This will also help us formulate more effective foreign policies.
Thank you, everyone.
The Author
