PREAMBLE
CPEC was to solve China's ‘Malacca Dilemma’ if a western economic blockade is enforced along the vital Strait of Malacca sea route.
Although the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was technically established two years after Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPEC is really a precursor to the BRI - and a special case.
The headwinds blowing against CPEC lies with Pakistani elites, the Balochi resistance and US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Further, the CPEC’s development is constrained by Pakistan’s financial difficulties, the instability of its domestic politics, and the threat of terrorist attacks targeting both BRI projects and Chinese citizens in the country.
Liu Zongyi (刘宗义)
of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) offers his views on those Western “misinformation (信息失真),” vs. grassroots “people-to-people” connections while implementing the CPEC.
INDIAN SCHOLARS COINED THE TERM ‘DEBT IMPERIALISM’ AND THEN PINNED IT ON CHINA (EXCERPTS)
Liu Zongyi (刘宗义)
Source: Guancha.cn (观察者网) – September 2023
Translated by Xiaomeng Sun
“The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is known as ‘the flagship project’ and ‘the pilot project’ of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), thus the CPEC’s achievements are of great significance for evaluating the success of the BRI. However, the problems reflected in the construction of the CPEC are more specific to it than generalisable [既有普遍性，更有特殊性]. Therefore, we should not exaggerate the significance of the CPEC’s achievements or setbacks.”
“Over the past decade, our direct investment in Pakistan has reached $25.4 billion. Since 2015, we have created a total of 236,000 jobs, helped Pakistan build an additional 510 kilometres of high-speed railways, added 8,000 megawatts of electricity, and increased the country's core transmission grid by 886 kilometres. [We have also] successfully built 13 power projects as well as many infrastructure [projects], including the Gwadar Port, a number of airports and roads, and the [Orange] Line metro in Lahore.”
“However, we must also recognise that the pace at which the CPEC is being built falls far short of what was originally planned. Minister Iqbal mentioned in his speech that the Pakistani government is currently focusing on finishing projects that were originally scheduled for completion in 2020.”
Challenges Facing the CPEC
“Since 2015, the challenges facing the corridor have not diminished. This is not to say that there has been no progress on Pakistan’s side. For example, in terms of planning, the Pakistanis have indeed been interacting with us and have learned quite a lot from our National Development and Reform Commission. However, with the development of the political situation within Pakistan and the changes in the global strategic environment, some challenges have become more prominent.”
“First, the construction of the CPEC continues to be severely hampered by Pakistan’s domestic politics and economy. In my opinion, the instability of Pakistani politics, the infighting among political parties, the disputes over local interests and the lack of continuity in economic policies are the primary factors limiting the construction of the CPEC. For so many years, Pakistan’s government has been unable to push through economic and tax reforms. [Furthermore,] vested interests are impossible to eradicate and debt crises have been occurring on a cyclical basis. It is very difficult for us to intervene in these issues [很难插手]. We are now genuinely hoping that after next year's general election, with the help of the military [在军方的维持之下], Pakistan will be able to maintain political stability for some time to come so as to help drive economic reforms and development in the country … With next year's general elections in sight, [however], I’m afraid that conflicts among voters may well escalate.”
“Second, the regional and international environment has deteriorated significantly, security threats have risen and violent terrorist attacks targeting Chinese projects and Chinese people in Pakistan have increased markedly. For example, the leader of the separatist terrorist group, the 'Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)', has openly voiced threats against China. This is due as much to political struggles between different parts of Pakistan and poor domestic governance as it is to the powerful influence of international factors [国际因素]. Against the backdrop of the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, some domestic and regional forces in Pakistan are trying to take advantage of the strategic rivalry both between China and the US and between China and India in order to achieve their own objectives. Both CPEC projects and Chinese people in Pakistan are [therefore] being used as leverage against Islamabad.”
“Third, Pakistan's elites are not steadfast in their stance towards China [对华立场不坚定]. Some of them worship Europe and America. Previously, during the construction of the corridor, there were demands from the Pakistanis that we should look to the West with regard to technology and standards and even use Western equipment. However, after the withdrawal of the US’s troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan's strategic importance [战略地位] declined. Faced with the Sino-US strategic competition, the Pakistani military and political elites now prefer to play a bridging role between China and the US, as they did in the 1970s. A few years ago, after Imran Khan came to power, [Islamabad] was very anxious to find a third party to participate in the construction of the CPEC, so as to reduce China's influence on Pakistan's economy.”
“Finally, the CPEC is subject to negative media coverage [负面炒作] by both the international and domestic press. At present, countries such as the United States and India attach great importance to the strategic role played by the media. They are waging an information, public opinion and cognitive war [against China], pinning the debt problems of developing countries on us and hyping up the so-called BRI ‘debt trap’, [thereby] tarnishing China's image [抹黑中国]. The term 'debt imperialism' was first coined by the Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney. It has since been widely propagated and exploited by the West.”
“Furthermore, with Pakistan’s relatively westernised media environment and the complexity of the consortiums that lie behind its media, some outlets are more inclined to publish pro-Western content. This is because some of them have a Western background or are even backed by Indian capital. Many people working in [Pakistan’s] media were educated in the West and are subconsciously influenced by Western views [潜移默化受到西方言论的影响]. The media’s choice of topics is also constrained by the topics set in the West. Many reports are copied directly from Western media. Thus, misinformation [信息失真] is extremely common.”
Policy Recommendations
“So, how can we respond to these challenges?”
“First of all, we must change the views of some people in Pakistan. Because the development of the BRI and CPEC have driven the development of Pakistan’s economy and [because] economic development inevitably leads to social and political changes, we must make people in Pakistan realise that such changes are beneficial to them. We need to plan for the CPEC in the long term. Since Pakistan’s government lacks experience in economic development and social governance, I believe that we should first of all place more focus on changing [their] view of development and guide [them] in a proactive way [积极引导]. From the national down to the local level and back up to the military, China and Pakistan should strengthen their exchanges with one another. Think tanks should play an important role in this regard.”
“Investment in Pakistan, for example, should be viewed from a long-term perspective and should continue after the political situation in Pakistan has stabilised. For the time being, we can first undertake some small but attractive projects [小而美的项目]. Personnel exchanges and training is of the utmost importance. Many of the projects carried out by the US, India, and even Japan as alternatives to the BRI are focused on people, on changing their hearts and minds [改变人心] and on building connections with them [建立人脉]. This, I believe, is a big challenge for us. That is why personnel exchanges and training are so important. For example, Tang International Education and the Luban Workshop are now quite popular in Pakistan. In future, we must continue to strengthen this type of work [继续加强这方面工作].”
“Second, [we must] strengthen China-Pakistan media cooperation and guide [Pakistani] public opinion in the right way [发挥正确的舆论引导作用]. We need to understand what the Pakistanis want to know about China. With the continuous development and rapid growth of China's economy and the significant rise of China’s overall power [综合国力], people in Pakistan are extremely interested in China's development model and development path. Their interest in all things related to China is growing by the day and they are more than eager to learn about our country and listen carefully to our story [倾听中国故事]. The key lies in how our overseas communication [我们的对外传播] can tell China's story well. This is a challenge for us.”
“China needs to study and analyse the demands and habits of the Pakistani people with regard to the dissemination of information in the media. While respecting their religious beliefs, cultural traditions and lifestyles, [we must] improve the penetration [渗透率], impact [落地性] and effectiveness [有效性] of [our] information and messages. We must also increase [our] closeness [贴近性] to the [Pakistani] audience and continue to strengthen exchanges between, and the training of, editors and journalists in both our countries.”
“Third, [we must] strengthen security cooperation. Currently, the Chinese in Pakistan are caught in a kind of defensive security predicament [防御性安保的困境], where they cannot have casual encounters [随便接触] with Pakistani people. Our projects and engineers are all being protected by them, but this has not solved the security issue. Meanwhile, Pakistan does not permit Chinese security companies to operate there, [nor does it allow them] to establish joint-venture security companies with Pakistani [firms]. [Such] defensive security protection is hardly sustainable. The key is how Pakistan can take measures to make society as a whole more peaceful and deradicalised. This is a very important social governance issue currently facing Pakistan.” [For a recent article looking at the involvement of Chinese security companies in Pakistan, see here]
“Finally, I think we do need to take the issue of third-party involvement seriously. To alleviate some of the economic and international pressure [that we are currently facing, we should:] allow the CPEC to become a truly multilateral cooperation project; promote the inclusion of neighbouring countries [and regions] such as Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia, Russia and Middle Eastern states; and [encourage] investment from, and cooperation with, Western multinationals.”
Name: Liu Zongyi (刘宗义)
Year of birth: Missing
Position: Senior fellow at the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies and secretary-general of the South Asia and China Center, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)
Research focus: South Asia; India’s economy and foreign policy; BRI; BRICS
Education: BA Shandong University of Finance and Economics (year missing); MA-PhD China Foreign Affairs University (2007)
Experience abroad: Visiting scholar at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) in India; at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) in Pakistan; at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the US; and at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Germany.
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