A year after Russia's near-border conflict with Ukraine, China-based scholars assess its impact on EU-China relations and undertake a glimpse at the future geopolitical terrain.
For one, there were signs that Germany is seeking to rebalance its Asia-Pacific strategy away from placing too much importance on China - as was the case under Merkel.
Previous three postings On Geoeconomics have indicated the European nation states’ perspectives and China’s posture on the EU positioning.
Present posting is a collection of summarised comments from various academics and think-tanks in China.
The writers may have similar opinions, but they also have different viewpoints - collectively collated as pointers below:
Key takeaways:
The war in Ukraine has hobbled the EU’s push for strategic autonomy, but its desire to pursue this goal remains.
The war has increased the EU’s dependence on and tilt towards the US. This trend is largely expected to continue.
The war has accelerated the EU’s shift of emphasis to “competitor” and “rival” in its triadic “partner-competitor-rival” positioning on China.
Beijing’s stance in the Russo-Ukrainian war has been misunderstood and has contributed to Europe’s growing antagonism towards Beijing.
The influence of pro-US (and China-sceptic) countries in central, eastern and northern Europe over EU decision-making has increased considerably over the past year. This is not good for EU-China relations.
The EU is beset with economic, political and social problems and the situation continues only to get worse. This is detrimental to the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.
The bloc remains a key player in international relations but its strength and influence are declining when compared with other major powers, notably the US and China.
Nevertheless, the EU is often seen as key to alleviating the diplomatic and economic pressure brought by the US on China.
Areas of cooperation with Europe still exist: global governance, climate change and economic cooperation tend to be the most frequently cited.
10. Past and upcoming visits to Beijing by European leaders signal that Europe still wants (or needs) to strengthen economic ties and engage with Beijing even if this means going against US wishes.
11. The EU’s economy is in the doldrums. Deepening economic ties will continue to be one of the keys to fostering closer relations with the EU and its members states. But the pull of the Chinese market will not prevent the EU from reducing its dependence on China in certain areas. Nor will it prevent the EU’s continued “interference” in and around the Indo-Pacific.
12. Transatlantic ties may have strengthened over the past year but rifts remain and could widen again in future. EU-US economic competition and European distrust of Washington should encourage the EU in its pursuit of strategic autonomy and prevent it from tilting too far towards the US (see also Xin Hua).
13. Germany’s forthcoming China strategy will act as a bellwether of EU-China relations.
14. Outlook for 2023: Uncertainty prevails. Assessments range from the pessimistic to the cautiously optimistic but adding a positive twist to such predictions is often de rigueur in China.
15. France and Germany remain the two key “pragmatic” countries that China should continue to engage with, though they have less sway over the EU than they used to.
16. France continues to be seen as the country most aligned with China’s hope for a more independent EU.
The writers include:
Jian Junbo (简军波) – Deputy director of the Centre for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University;
AuYan Shaohua (严少华) – Junior research associate at the Centre for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University;
Long Jing (龙静) – Deputy director of the Centre for European Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS);
Long Jing (龙静) – Deputy director of the Centre for European Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS);
Zhang Jian (张健) – Director of the Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).