Since the announcement of AUKUS, there is much discourse on the bigger issue of Australia strategic posture viv-a-vis with her southeast Asian countries and the enlarged defence of her territory from afar if China is taken as the main adversary when embroiled in the Sino-US rivalry, (see also SWP Research Paper; USIP, 30/03/2023); SCMP, 16/03/2024).
Firstly, Australia needs the means to stop any adversary from launching an attack across what as regarded as her air-sea gap. Secondly, Australia needs to be able to deny any adversary access to island and or territorial anchor-base in the immediate region that could facilitate any such attack. Thirdly, Australia has an interest in the archipelagic region of South-East Asia from Indonesia through the Philippines as history has shown that this area can be either a conduit or a barrier. Fourthly, Australia’s interests are concerned with the balance of power within the Indo-Pacific as unchecked growth may develop into an irrepressible force.
If one is to take Palmerston's maxim of ‘no eternal allies, and having no perpetual enemies then Australian interests are eternal and perpetual…’ whence her military capacity would more likely be in response to an evolving strategic environment, (Asia Pacific Defence, 27/06/2023).
The Australian Division and National Strategy as presented by Jeremy Barraclough is available HERE.